Review of grain storage handling, processing, and distibution problems and proposals in the Republic of Korea by Ackels, Alden A. et al.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR AID USE ONLY 
WASHINGTON. 0. C. 20523 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET Batch #24 
, A. PRIMARY 
I.SUBJECT Agriculture AE70-0000-G704 
CLASS I-
FICATION I" SECONDARY 
_ Distribution and marketing--Korea Rep. 
2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
Review of grain storagehandling,processing,and distribution problems and proposals
 
in the Republic of Korea
 
3. AUTHOR(S) 
Ackels,A.A.; Gormely,Patrick; Keck,Martin
 
4. DOCUMENT DATE 5. NUMBER OF PAGES 6. ARC NUMBER 
1968 88p. ARC KS631.23. KI 6 
7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 
Kan.State
 
S. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (Sponsoring Organlzalon, Publishers, Availabilitjy) 
(InFood grain drying,storage,handling,and transportation rpt.no.6)
 
9. ABSTRACT 
10. CONTROL NUMBER II. PRICE OF DOCUMENT 
PN-RAB-416 
12. DESCRIPTORS 13. PROJECT NUMBER 
Grain crops 
 4. CONTRACT NUMBER 
Korea Rep. CSD-1588 GTS
 
Storage 
 15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT 
AID 590-1 (4.74) 
'<VPP
 
REVIEW OF GRADN. STORAGE, HANDLING, PRPCESSING,
 
AND DISTRIBUTION PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS
 
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
 
DEPARTMENT OF GRAIN SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY
 
U. ,S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
SEOUL, KOREA 
September 1968 
PREFACE
 
The review team is grateful for the assistance
 
given to it by so many people in Korea. Without
 
their help this report could not have been writ­
ten. Of special, and constant help were: 
Mr. John L. Cooper, Chief, Rural Development Di­
vision, USAID/Korea
 
Mr. Paul Bedard, Deputy Chief, Rural Development
 
Division, USAID/Korea 
Dr. Fletcher E. Riggs, Agricultural Economics
 
Branch Chief, RDD, USAID/Korea 
Mrs. Muriel de Jong and her staff, RDD, USAID/Korea 
Mr. Lee, Yang Jim, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, Republic of Korea 
Mr. Won, Kwang Shik, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, Republic of Korea 
The Study Team
 
Dr. Patrick Gormely
 
Martin Keck
 
A. A. Ackels
 
85Maps 
Provinces and Cities -- 85
 
Population -------- - -- 86
 
87Railroads -

Highway ------ 88
 
Planned Highways - 89
 
Rice Production --------------------------------- 90
 
Common Barley Production ------------------------- 91
 
Naked Barley Production ---------------92
 
Wheat Production -------------------------------- 93
 
Soybean Production ------------------ 94
 
Rice Milling Capacity -------------------------------- 95
 
Warehouse Capacity ------------------ 96
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
- 1Introduction 
Section I - The Study Defined -------------------------- 6 
Section II - Information Collected -------------------- 6 
Mensuration Tables --------------- -------- 7 
Population Projections --------------------------- 8 
Grain Production Projections --------------------- 10 
Grain Imports and Exports ------------------------ 24 
Grain Consumption Per Capita --------------------- 25 
Grain Warehouse Capacity ------------------------- 26 
Grain Warehouse Classifications - --- 27 
Government Grain Losses -------------------------- 29 
Rice Milling Capacity --------------------------- 30 
Barley Milling Capacity -------------------------- 31 
Wheat Flour Milling Capacity - Commercial --------- 32 
Grain Import and Export Detailed ----------------- 33 
Grain Production -------------------- 36 
Grain Land Area --------------------------------- 37 
Rice Varieties by Areas -------------------------- 37 
Wheat Storage Capacity - Commercial Mills --------- 38 
Wheat Storage Capacity - Com'l Mills, Port Docks - 38 
Ports of Entry --------------------------------- 39 
Port Depths ------------------------------------ 39 
Section III - Analysis of the Information ------------- 40 
Physical Logistics -- ----------------- 40 
Grain Food Technology --------------------------- 47 
Financial ----------------------------------- 8 
Ministry of Agriculture Application -------------- 60 
Yu Pung Grain Silo Co. - Loan Application --------- 67 
Section IV - Recommendations ------------------------- 73 
Republic of Korea Government Action -------------- 73 
Farm Storage ------------------------------- 73 
Warehouse Classification and Inspection ---------- 74 
Sanitation Practices ---------------------------- 74 
Consumer Testing ----------------------------- 74 
Rice Milling -------------------------------- 74 
Finance -------------------------------------
Feasibility Study ------------------------------ 78 
Feasibility Study Manning Table ------------------ 81 
Bibliography --------------------------------------- 83 
REVIEW OF GRAIN STORAGE, HANDLING, PROCESSING, 
AND DISThIBUTION PROBLEMS AND PROPOSALS IN THE
 
REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
Introduction
 
In keeping with its contract to provide technical assistance
 
to the United States Agency for International Development, Kansas
 
State University was requested to provide a team to study the
 
problems of the grain food supply of Korea from the farm and port 
to market. A statement of the objectives and scope of work for the 
study was prepared and presented to the study team by Mr. William
 
F. Johnson of the East Asia Technical Advisory Staff, Bureau for
 
East Asia, Agency for International Development, Washington, D. C.
 
This report is the result of that study. It is intended that
 
the report represent investigations into each of the subjects
 
included in the "scope of work" requested. It will either present
 
conclusions reached from the study for a course of action, or
 
recommendations for further studies.
 
In the belief that the AID and the Republic of Korea Govern­
ment (hereinafter ROKG) will require further work before loans for
 
facilities will be granted, the study team has prepared this report 
in the general format of Manual Order 1221.2 entitled "Feasibility 
Studies, Economic and Technical Soundness Analysis, Capital Projectso
 
That manual order requires a depth of study, verification of data,
 
engineering planning of "project budget" depth, and accurate economic 
analysis of cost versus benefits that is beyond the scope of the
 
services to be provided under the applicable contract and the manning
 
schedule of this study. Nevertheless, the team has approached this
 
study in a manner designed to establish the additional work needed
 
to meet the manual requirements and to make the work useful to those
 
who may prepare a detailed feasibility study without retracing the
 
same ground.
 
Time limitations have precluded verification of available data 
offered by the ROKG or USAID/K except in those instances where
 
obvious inconsistencies could be discerned. We have reason to doubt
 
the validity of much of the available data but we have no measure­
ment of the significance of the deviations that may exist.
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USAID/K requested that the units of measurement employed in 
reporting the study be the metric system for mensuration, and the
 
United States dollar for currency. The study generally adheres to 
that request. A conversion chart is included in this report 
covering those units found necessary in its preparation. 
someFor those who are not intimately familiar with Korea, 
background data on the nation is needed to understand its grain 
economy and technology. 
Geographically, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) is the
 
southerly portion of a mountainous peninsula extending southeasterly
 
from the Asian mainland in the North Temperate Zone lying mainly
 
between 1260 and 1300 East Longitude and 330 and 380 North Latitude.
 
There are several thousand generally small, adjacent islands. The
 
- the Easterly boundary,Westerly boundary is the shallow Yellow Sea 
the Sea of Japan. The land area is reported to be about 98,477 
square kilometers.
 
Tillable land is generally located along the valleys of the 
con­watercourses of the country and the gently rolling uplands 
tiguous thereto. There are no significant upland agricultural 
plains. However, the tillable lands are rather well distributed 
throughout the country. It is estimated that over 500,000 hectares
 
of present forest land can be reclaimed into cultivated upland,
 
increasing total cultivated area by about 25 percent.
 
The north temperate climate is greatly affected by its water
 
borders to the West, East, and South and the Asian land mass in the
 
North. Summer temperatures are high with a mean in the magnitude
 
of 250C to 30°C and a high in the magnitude of 40 C. Winter
 
temperatures are cold with a mean in the magnitude of (-)5°C to
 
50C and a low in the magnitude of (-)30°C. The southerly coastal
 
areas, tempered by their sea boundaries are relatively warm compared 
to the northerly high plateau affected both by altitude and proximity 
to the Asian land mass. Average relative humidity over the year 
approximates 68% to 75% depending on location. Summer averages are 
high at 78% to 91%. Winter averages range from a low of 44% to a
 
high of about 73% depending on location with a national average
 
probably in the low 60's.
 
The population are deemed to be descendents of Shantung Chinese, 
Mongol, and Tungus peoples. The latest, October 1, 1966 census, 
counted 29,207,856 people, an increase of 17% since the last census 
in 1960. Population density is about 297 people per square kilometer ­
a very high density, further complicated by the large mountainous
 
areas unsuitable for agriculture. The present annual net rate of 
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increase in population is 2.7%, among the highest in the wold,
 
which, if unchecked by the serious effort being made in birth control,

will result in double the present population in about twenty-five 
years. In 1966 there were some 5,118,000 households of which 2,498,550 
were Xarm and 2,619,500 were urban. There were thus about an average
of 5.7 people per household. Data available indicates the farm com­
ponent to be higher than urban at about 6.21 people per household in
 
1966.
 
Of the total land area of 98,477 squarpe kilometers only 22,934(23%) are cultivated. 12,871 square kilometers, 12.9Kof the total
 
-iea and 56.1% of the cultivated area are paddy lands. 10,060 square

kilometers, 10.1% of the total area and 43.9% of the 
cultivated area, 
are cultivated uplands. 
The problems of feeding the population from

the small per capita resource of tillable land are apparent. It is
 
clear that success depends primarily on the factors of cultural
 
technology, population control and enlarging the land base. The
 
tillable land per capita is only 0.0785 hectares (0.247 acres). The
 
total population density per hectare of cultivated land is thus
 
12.7 people (4.05 per acre.j Obviously, the farmer must be efficient
 
and the land highly productive to feed the existing 12.7 people from 
each hectare of cultivated land. To the extent that he does not do
 
so now, and increase his productivity in the future to meet the needs
 
of the expanding population, the nation must meet its food deficit
 
by importation. 
The farm economy is now and probably will continue to be a /'
labor intensive industry. The high farm population on small r /areas 
would em to preclude heavy mechanization. The 2,540,274 farm
 
householdsEo 
----l1,780,706 people, or 6.21 people per household,
 
have a land area of O25 hectares for each family on which to
 
produce and live (equal to 2.23 acres per family). Each farmer thus
 
must feed his own family of 6.21 people and 5.25 urban people from
 
0.9025 hectares of land fof' h--resent fo6d economy to be self
 
sufficient. In addition, there will be a demand for competing

materials such as non-food industrial raw materials, tobacco, fibre
 
and flowers that are bound to divert some area and increase the food 
productivity demand from the remainder.
 
In_12-6 there were $31,091,000 more imports of food products
than were exported. Included in that total figure, though, were$54 454,000 more imports of grain and grain products than were 
eporte . This probably represents the net demand over production
 
for foods, and indicates the relative attractiveness of grain and
 
grain products as importation materials when due weight is given to
 
-the basis of payment for grains and grain products imported under
 
U.S. Public Law 480. 
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The structure of government in Korea somewhat resembles the
 
United States form of Government. A constitution provides the basic
 
law. A President with powers similar to those of the U.S. President
 
is the Chief Executive. He administers through an appointed Prime
 
Minister and a State Council of Ministers similar to the U.S. Cabinet.
 
There are fourteen ministries, one of which is the Ministry of Agri­
culture and Forestry, with whom this team has been associated in the
 
development of this report,
 
The National Assembly is the law making legislative body for
 
the Republic. It is unicameral with a present membership of 175,
 
part of whom are elected by vote and part of whom are appointed by
 
their political parties in proportion to their membership.
 
An independent Judiciary administers the laws through a system
 
composed of a Supreme Court, Appellate Courts, District Courts, and
 
Family Courts.
 
The nation is divided into eleven provinces, including "Special 
Cities" Seoul and Pusan as political entities with provincial 
status, The provinces are further divided into counties, cities, 
towns, villages, wards, etc. according to the organization needs and 
wants of the people, apparently decided in considerable measure by 
the historical organizations of the people0 The constitution provides 
for local autonomy in the organization and administration of local 
matters that have not been preempted by National Law, 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, with which this study
 
is concerned, is headed by a Minister, a Vice Minister, and then,
 
starting down the line in which our interests lie; an Assistant Vice
 
Minister for Agricultural Administration, a Food Administration
 
Bureau, and the Food Management Section of that Bureau, with which
 
we have worked directly.
 
The Korean economy has grown rapidly in recent years. It is
 
estimated that the real rate of growth per year in the period 1962­
1966 was 8.3%. This was an increase over the 5.0% per year increase
 
during 1957-1961. Rapid growth has continued to the present time.
 
The AFriculture-Forestry-Fishlng sector of the economy grew at 
5.5 percentp2yar during 1962-1966 (up from 4.9 percent per year 
during 1957-1961). The rest, of the economy grew at 10.6 percent per 
year during 1962-1966 (up from 5.2 percent per year during 1957­
1.61). Industrial production has grown especially rapidly in recent 
years. Manufactured output doubled in the four-year period beginning
 
in February 1964,
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The high rate of growth of the Korean economy brought about an
 
increase in per capita income of approximately 5,6 percent per year
 
during 1962-1966 (up from 2.1 percent per year during 1957-1961).
 
Inflation has been severe in Korea. The wholesale price index
 
increased an average 7.2 percent per year in the period 1957-1961,
 
and 16.5 percent per year during 1962-1966. The consumer price index
 
increased 7.8 percent per year in the period 1957-1961, and 16.6
 
percent per year in the period 1962-1966. There is indication that
 
the rate has declined in 1967-68.
 
Exports have grown very rapidly in recent years, from only $33
 
million in 1960 to $320 million in 1967. But imports have grown
 
rapidly also. Commercial imports grew from $98 million in 1960 to
 
$674 million in 1967. "Official Aid" imports were $232 million in
 
1960, stayed at about that level until 1963, and have since declined
 
to $119 million in 1967. Imports financed by foi ,.ign loans grew
 
from zero in 1960 to $167 million in 1967. 
The Korean economy has been using more resources in recent years
 
than it has produced domesticallyo The gap represents resources made
 
available to Korea by foreigners, either as grants or loans. These 
additional resources, if well used, allow the economy to grow faster
 
than it would in their absence. As the Korean economy grows it should
 
be possible for it to support from its own resources the investment
 
required to sustain a high growtn rate. The need for grants, and
 
loans on non-market terms, would cease,
 
In spite of the growth of the economy high unemployment persists.
 
Of the economically active population of 9,325,000 in 1966, 7.1% or
 
666,000 were unemployed. Under-employment is probably of greater
 
consequence,
 
As a result of the very high growth rate of the economy and the
 
continuing demand for investment money, interest rates are high.
 
Commercial bank "official" rates quoted in May 1968 were, for example:
 
1. 27.6% per annum for time deposits.
 
2. 24% discount on commercial bills. 
Government restrains inflation by regulating credit availability
 
and interest rates through the operations and rules of the central
 
Bank of Korea,
 
It is within that framework of a nation that the study has
 
considered the grain supply problem, and formulated recommendations.
 
Section I
 
The Study
 
The stated objective of the study is to provide assistance in
 
assessing the adequacy of existing facilities and determining the 
economic and technical feasibility of improving the grain storage, 
handling, processing, and distribution system in the ROK. The end
 
goal is a rational system of grain supply management by the ROKG 
that will achieve a proper balance of supplies for the people with
 
stabilization of prices for the producer and the consumer at levels
 
that will result in incentives for the domestic producer. 
The scope of work outlined is in two parts:
 
1. Survey the needs for an overall grain storage, processing,
 
and distribution system. Based on those findings, recommend the
 
further feasibility studies and engineering design needed.
 
2. In the context of the overall needs of the nationjreview
 
the preliminary loan application proposal of the ROKG for funds to 
build thirty insulated grain storage warehouses, with total space
 
for 108,000 metric tons. 
The only requirement for the study, as outlined for the team, 
that is in addition to the requirements of Manual Order 1221.2 is 
that the resulting recommendations must be reviewed by ROKG and 
U.N. Military authorities for National Security, and their alterna­
tive suggestions evaluated.
 
The scope of work provides that the economic analysis shall
 
"use internal rate of return analysis, or other techniques approved
 
in advance by ROKG and USAID/Ko"
 
Section II 
Information
 
It is intended that this section shall contain the principal
 
data on which analysis and recommendations are based.
 
Conversations with Korean and USAID/K experts on many of the
 
pertinent subjects have been kept in note form, but are not
 
generally included in this section. Such information influenced the
 
findings of the team.
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Mensuration Equivalents of Use in the Study
 
Volume
 
1 U.s. (Winchester) bushell = 1.2445 cubic feet 
1 cubic foot = 0.8036 U.S. bushel 
1 U.S. bushel 35.2379 liters
 
1 cubic foot = 28.316 liters
 
1 liter = 0.03532 cubic feet
 
1 liter = 0.02838 U.S. bushels
 
1 Korean market bag = 100 liters of polished grain
 
1 Korean farm bag = 100 liters of unhulled grain
 
1 suk (seok) = 5.119 U.S. bushels
 
1 suk = 6.37037 cubic feet 
1 suk = 180.39 liters 
1 suk = 0.18039 cubic meters 
1 hop = 0.001 suk 
Area
 
1 hectare = 2.47104 acres
 
1 hectare = 0.01 square kilometer
 
1 acre = 0.40469 hectares
 
1 chongbo (cheongbo) = 0.99174 hectares
 
1 cheongbo = 2o4506 acres
 
1 tanbo = 0.099174 hectares
 
1 tanbo = 0.24506 acres
 
1 tanbo = 0.1 cheongbo
 
1 pyong = 3.3058 square meters
 
1 pyong = 35.5704 square feet
 
1 square meter = 10.76387 square feet
 
1 square foot = 0.0929 square meters
 
Weight
 
1 kilogram = 2.20462 pounds
 
1 metric ton = 1,000 kilograms
 
1 metric ton = 2,204.62 pounds
 
1 metric ton = 1.10231 U.S. (short) tons
 
1 metric ton = 266.67 kwan
 
1 pound = 0.45359 kilograms
 
1 U.S. (short) ton = 0.90719 metric tons
 
1 kwan = 0.00375 metric tons
 
1 kwan = 8.2672 pounds
 
1 kwan = 3.75 kilograms
 
1 doo 8.0 kilograms
 
1 keun= 0.16 kwan = 0.6 kg
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Standard weights per unit volume
 
1 standard straw bag polished rice = 80 kg
 
1 standard straw bag paddy rice = 54 kg
 
1 standard straw bag barley = 50 kg
 
1 standard straw bag naked barley = 60 kg
 
1 standard straw bag wheat = 60 kg
 
1 standard straw bag polished barley = 60 kg 
1 barrel of flour = 196 lbs0 
1 barrel of flour = 88.905 kg 
1 bag of wheat flour = 22 kg
 
1 seok (suk) paddy rice = 100 kg
 
1 suk polished rice = 144 kg
 
1 suk barley = 99 kg
 
1 suk naked barley = 138 kg
 
1 suk wheat = 138 kg
 
1 liter paddy rice = 0.55435 kg
 
1 liter polished rice = 0.79827 kg
 
1 liter barley = 0,54881 kg
 
1 liter naked barley = 0.765 kg
 
1 liter wheat = 0.765 kg
 
Currency
 
1 U.S. dollar = 274 won
 
1 won = $0,00361 U.S.
 
Population projection
 
Procedure followed to obtain the 1971 population of Korea by
 
province. The 1966 population of Korea by province (farm and non­
farm) was used as the base. The farm population is assumed to grow
 
at 1,7 percent per year from 1966 to 1971 and the non-farm population
 
is assumed to grow at 3.7 percent per year from 1966 to 1971. After
 
obtaining the farm and non-farm populations in 1971 by province they
 
were summed to give total population for each province in 1971. The
 
rate of growth for farm population (1.7%) and the rate of growth for
 
non-farm population (3.7) were used by USAID in "Food Grain Gap
 
Analysis".
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Population in 1971, Projected from 1966 Base, in Million Persons.
 
Jrowth Rate Farm Population 1.7% per War? Non-Farm Population 3.7%
 
1966 1971
 
Non- Non-.
 
Total(l) Farm(2) Farm(3) Total(4) Farm(5) Farm(6)
 
Seoul 3.805 .108 3.697 4.551 .117 4.434
 
Pusan' 1.430 .060 1.370 1.708 .065 1.643
 
Kyonggi 3.102 1.603 1.504 3.548 1.744 1.804
 
Kangwon 1.832 .934 .898 2.093 1.016 1.077
 
Chung-Puk 1.550 1.111 .439 1.735 1;209 .526
 
Chung-Nam 2.913 2.026 .887 3.268 2.204 1.064 
Chon-Puk 2.524 1.773 .751 2.830 1.929 .901 
Chon-Nam 4.052 2.884 1.168 4.537 3.136 1.401 
Kyong-Puk 4.479 2.762 1.717 5.064 3.005 2.059 
Kyong-Nam 3.178 2.263 .915 3.559 2.462 1.097 
Cheju 0.337 .255 .082 .375 .277 .098 
Total 29.208 15.781 13.427 33.268 17.164 16.104 
1971 Farm Population = 1.0879 X 1966 
Non-Farm Population = 1.1993 X 1966 
1971 Total = Farm + Non-Farm 
Columns (1) and (2) from MAF, Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry 
Statistics 1967, pp. 22-23, 38-39.
 
Column (3) = (1) - (2) 
Column (5) = (2) projected at 1.7% per Year 
Column (6) = (3) projected at 3.7% per year 
Column (4) = (5) + (6) 
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Prolected 1971 Population by Area 
1971 Pop. % 
Seoul 4,551 13.7 
Pusan 1,708 5.1 
Kyon~gi 3,548 10.7 
Kangwon 2,093 6.3 
Chungchong-Pukto 1,735 5.2 
Chungchong-Namdo 3,268 9.8 
Cholla-Pukto 2,830 8.5 
Cholla--Namdo 4,537 13.6 
Kyongsang-Pukto 5,064 15.2 
Kyongsang-Namdo 3,559 10.7 
CheJu 375 1.1 
Total 33,268 100.0 
(Paddy) Rice Production Projection, by Area. 1965-1971
 
(Mil. MT)
 
PolishedBase 
1965 1967 1968 .;1969 .' 1970 "? 1971 
Seoul .022 .025 .025 .025 .025 .026 
Pusan .013 .015 .016 .016 .017 .017 
Kyonggi .467 .618 .642 .665 .680 .701 
Kangwon .119 .149 .155 .161 .165 .169 
Chung-Puk .202 .251 .260 .268 .274 .280 
Chung-Nam .483 .606 .628 .648 .663 .682 
Chon-Puk .481 .586 .604 .620 .632 .648­
Chon-Nam .603 .747 .773 .796 .814 .835 
Kyong-Puk .584 .696 .715 .732 .747 .764 
Kyong-Nam .489 ;587 .611 .634 .653 .675 
Cheju .003 .004 .004 .004 .004 .005 
Total 3.464 4.285 4.434 4.568 4.673 4.802 
This "total" figure same as in 1967 Yearbook of A&F Statistics,
 
p. 199, but province breakdown not same.
 
MAF, Se.;ond Five-Year Economic Development Plan, Food Grain
 
Statistic (in Korea), pp. 18-27.
 
(Upland) Rice Production Projection, by Area, 1965-1971
 
(Mil. MT) 
Polished 
Base 
1965 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Seoul .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
 
Pusan .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
 
Kyonggi .003 .006 .006 .006 .006 .006
 
Kangwon .001 .003 .003 .003 .003 .003
 
Chung-Puk .003 .003 .004 .004 .004 .004
 
Chung-Nam .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004
 
Chon-Puk .009 .013 .013 .014 .014 .014
 
Chon-Nam .006 .008 .009 .009 ,010 .010
 
Kyong-Puk .003 .003 .003 .003 .003 .003
 
Kyong-Nm .005 .005 .006 .006 .006 .006
 
Cheju .003 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004
 
Total .037 .050 .052 .053 .055 .056
 
1965 data same as in 1967 Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry
 
Statistics, p. 201.
 
MAF, Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan, Food Grain
 
Production (in Korea), pp. 31-35.
 
Rice (Paddy + Upland) Production Projection by Area, 1965-1971 
Polished
 
Base Mil. MT
 
1965 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
 
Seoul .022 .025 .025 .025 .025 .026
 
Pusan .013 .015 .016 .016 .017 .017
 
Kyonggi .470 .624 .648 .671 .686 707
 
Kangwon .120 .152 .158 .164 .168 .172
 
Chung-wPuk .205 .254 .264 .272 .278 .284
 
Chung-Nam .487 .610 .632 .652 .667 .686
 
Chon-Puk .490 .599 .617 .634 .646 .662
 
Chon-Nam .609 .755 .782 .805 .824 .845
 
Kyong-Puk .587 .699 .718 .735 .750 .767
 
Kyong-Nam .494 .592 .617 .640 .659 .681
 
Cheju .006 .008 .008 .008 .008 .009
 
Total 3.501 4.335 4.485 4.622 4:728 4.858
 
This table computed by adding table for paddy rice and table for
 
upland rice.
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Paddy Rice Production Increase ­
(Polished) The Sources of the Extra Output 
Base 1965 

Target 1971 

Total increase 

New variety 

Seed improvement 

Early planting 

3.464 MT (Mil.)
 
4.802 MT
 
1.338 MT
 
Deep plowing & fertilizer improvement 

Soil improvement 

Better timing and scheduling of farming 

Disease - insect control 

Paddy rice direct seeding on dry land 

Opening new paddy land 

Irrigation 

Land lost to other uses 

Total 

.062 4.6 
.071 5.3 
.086 6.4 
10.8 
6.0 
213 15.9 
(17) 12.8 
.057 4.3 
081 6.5 
v399 29.8 
-.030 -2.2 
+1.338 100.0 
MAP, Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan, (Food Grain
 
Production) (in Koreen), pp. 26-27.
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"Causes" of rice production increase as given in Ministry of
 
Agriculture and Forestry, An Overall Agricultural Development Plan
 
(Draft 1967-1971, January 3967.
 
Soils (1) Add 10,000 power plows for deep plowing 
(2) Add 440 tractors
 
(3) Add 250,000 tons of soil improvement agents
 
Disease (1) Add 6,600 sprayers
 
(2) Disease forecast
 
Others (1) Irrigation expansion
 
(2) Reclamation
 
(3) Farmland "rezoning" p. 60
 
Upland Rice Production Increase
 
1965-1971 The sources of
 
(Mil. Mr) the extra output
 
1965 (base) .037 
1971 (target) .056 
.019 
Mul. MT %. 
Seed improvement .002 10.5 
New land .015 78.9 
Better timing of activities .001 5.3 
Insect-disease control .001 5.3 
.019 100.0 
MAF, Second Five-Year EDP (Food Grain Production) P. 35
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Rice Consumption Projection, by Province
 
1971
 
(Mil. MT) (Polished)
 
Mil. MT 
Seoul .634 ( ,7 
Pusan .236 .1 
Kyonggi .495 10.7 
Kangwon .291 6.3 
Chungchong-Pukto .240 5.2 
Chungchong-Namdo .453 9.8 
Cholla-Pukto .393 8.5 
Cholla-Namdo .629 13,6 
Kyongsang-Pukto .703 15.2 
Kyongsang-Namdo .495 10.7 
Cheju .051 1.1 
Total 41624 100.0
 
The figure for total rice consumption (4.624) is taken from
 
"Food Grain Gap Analysis", Table 3.
 
It is assumed that rice consumption is proportional to population.
 
The allocation of consumption by province is based on the 1971
 
population projection for each province.
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Computation of Rice "Surplus" 
and "Deficit" Provinces 
(1) Production Target MAF for 1970 
(2) Consumption Estimate for RY 1971 
following USAID "Food Grain Gap Analysis" 
(Mi. MT) (Ml. MT) Surplus(+) 
Production Consumption Deficit(-) 
Seoul .025 .634 -.609 
Pusan .017 .236 -.219 
Kyonggi .686 .495 +.191 
Kangwon .168 .291 -. 123 
Chungchong-Pukto .278 .240 +o038 
Chungchong-Namdo .667 .453 +,214 
Cholla-Pukto .646 .393 +o253 
Cholla-Namdo .824 .629 +.197 
Kyongsang-Pukto .750 .703 +.047 
Kyongsang-Namdo .659 .495 +.164 
Cheju .008 .051 -.043 
Total 4.728 4.624* +,10 
* Column does not add due to rounding. 
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Barley Production Projection, by Area 
1965-1971 
(Mil. MT) 
Seoul 
Pusan 
Kyonggi 
Kangwon 
Chungchong-Pukto 
Chungchong-Namdo 
Cholla-Pukto 
Cholla-Namdo 
Kyongsang-Pukto 
Kyongsang-Namdo 
Cheju 
Base 
1965 
.002 
.002 
.079 
.018 
.069 
.082 
.012 
.001 
.258 
.184 
.009 
1967 
.002 
.001 
.084 
.019 
.072 
.057 
.013 
.008 
.234 
.136 
.012 
1968 
.002 
.001 
.094 
.022 
.085 
.047 
.004 
.010 
.210 
.182 
.012 
1969 
.002 
.001 
.101 
.023 
.090 
.046 
.004 
.011 
.208 
.186 
.013 
12970 
.002 
.001 
.108 
.025 
.094 
.045 
.004 
.011 
.202 
.190 
.014 
1271 
.002 
.001 
.112 
.026 
.096 
.043 
.046 
.012 
.192 
.192 
.015 
Total .718 .639 .669 .686 .696 .696 
MAF, Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan, Food Grain 
Production (in Korean), pp 42-51. 
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Barley Production Increase
 
1965-1971 

(Mill MT) 

1965 (base) .718 
1971 (target) .696 
-.022 
Seed improvement 

Lime 

Transplanting cultivation 

Better spacing of seed 

New variety (shifting land to wheat) 

Paddy land - increased double cropping 

Redlaimed land 

Total 

Mil. MT 
.019
 
.021
 
.018
 
.046
 
-.227
 
+.039
 
+.062
 
-V022 

Sources of the
 
output increase
 
100.0
 
MAF, Second Five Year EDP (Food Grain Production), pp 50-51
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Naked Barley Production Projection, by Area 
1965-1971 
(Ml. MT) 
Base 
1965 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Seoul .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Pusan .003 .007 .007 .007 .007 .007 
Kyonggi .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Kangwon .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Chungchong-Pukto .002 .002 .003 .004 .004 .004 
Chungchong-Namdo .075 .128 .168 .66 .181 .184 
Cholla-Pukto .208 .224 .252 .250 .244 .235 
Cholla-Namdo .452 .466 .478 .477 .474 .465 
Kyongsang-Pukto .007 .052 .086 .094 .099 .101 
Kyongsang-Namdo .135 .243 .191 .184 .176 .166 
Cheju .044 .041 .047 .050 .052 .053 
Total .928 1.162 '1.232 1.230 1.237 1.215 
MAF, Second Five-Year EDP, Food Grain Production, pp 52-61 
(inKorean) 
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Naked Barley Production Increase (cause)
 
1965-1971
 
(__ ._MT)( us 
 I)
 
1965 (base) .928 //L j.
 
1971 (target) _1.215
 
,287
 
Mil. MT
 
Seed improvement .030 10.5
 
Lime .035 12.2
 
Transplanting cultivation .035 12.2
 
Better spacing .077 26.8
 
Shifting to wheat -.041 -14.3
 
Paddy field - increased double cropping .089 31.0
 
Reclaimed land .063 22.0
 
Total 
 .287 100M0
 
MAF, Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (Food Grain
 
Production) pp 60;-61
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Wheat Production Projections, by Area 
1965-1971 
(Mil. MT) 
Seoul 
Pusan 
Kyonggi 
Kangwon 
Chungchong-Pukto 
Chungchong-Namdo 
Cholla-Pukto 
Cholla-Namdo 
Kyongsang-Pukto 
Kyongsang-Namdo 
Cheju 
Base 
196 
.000 
.001 
p019 
.009 
.021 
.019 
.014 
.034 
.046 
.027 
.000 
1967 
.000 
.001 
.021 
.008 
.021 
.026 
.025 
.041 
.068 
.034 
.000 
1968 
.000 
.001 
.023 
.010 
.026 
.033 
.034 
.063 
.077 
.043 
.000 
1969 
.000 
.001 
.025 
.010 
.026 
.039 
.045 
.087 
.092 
.059 
.000 
1970 
.000 
.001 
.026 
.011 
.027 
.046 
.057 
.112 
.107 
.075 
.000 
1971 
.000 
.001 
.028 
.011 
.027 
.052 
.068 
.138 
.121 
.092 
.000 
Total .191 .239 .308 .384 .402 .536 
MAF, Second Five-Year Plan, Food Grain Production (in Korean) 
pp 62-71 ( 
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Wheat Production Increase 
1965-1971 (Cause) 
(Mil. MT) 
1965 (base) .191 
1971 (target) .535 
Increase .A45 
Ml. MT A._ 
Seed improvement .005 2.0 
Lime .014 4.1 
Transplanting .023 6.7 
Better spacing .059 17 1 
Shift from barley and naked barley °235 68,1 
Paddy land .003 1.0 
Reclamation land .007 2.0 
Total .345 100.0 
MAF, Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan (Food Grain
 
Production pp 70-71.
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"Causes" of barley-wheat production increase as given in
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, An Overall Agricultural

Development Plan (Draft) 1967-1971. January 1967 
(1) Improve: seeds
 
(2) two million tons of lime to neutralize acidity
 
(3) Promote cultivation by transplanting
 
(4) Increase sowing intervals
 
(5) Expand farmland (a)by getting second crop
 
(b) reclamation p.61
 
Soybean Production Projection, by Area
 
1965-1971
 
(Mil. MT)
 
Base
 
1965 1967 196 1969 1970 1971
 
Seoul .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 .000
 
Pusan 
.000 .000 .000 0000 .000 
 .000 
Kyonggi 
.025 .033 .036 
 .039 .041 .044
 
Kangwon 
.017 .022 .024
.021 .024 .027
 
Chungchong-Pukto 

.019 .022 .024 .025 .025 .026
 
Chungchong-Namdo 
.030 
 .037 .040 .041 .042 .043
 
Cholla-Pukto 

.012 .017 .018 .030 .020 .020
 
Cholla-Namdo 

.020 .030 .034 .025 .042 .046
 
Kyongsang-Pukto 
.035 .047 .051
.043 .049 .053
 
Kyongsang-Namdo 
.014 
 .016 .017 .018 .019 .020
 
Cheju 
.002 .004 .002
.002 .002 .002
 
Total 
.174 .242 .267
.222 .253 .281
 
MAF, Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan, Food Grain
 
Production (in Korean) pp 162-171
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Soybean Production Increase
 
(Mil. MT) Source of the
 
output increase
 
1965 (base) 0174
 
1971 (target) .281
 
Increase .107
 
Mil. MT 
Seed improvement .008 7.5 
Better timing of farm operation .029 ?7.4 
Fertilizer .005 4.7 
Lime .000 0.0 
Upland )
) Land expansion 
.029 27.4 
Reclamation) .035 33,0 
Total .o6 100.0
 
MAF, Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan, Food Grain
 
Production (in Korean), pp 170-171
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Imports of Grain
 
1957-1968
 
(Ml. MT) 
TotaL grain 
Year import 
1957 .966 
1958 .968 
1959 .267 
1960 .468 
1961 .603 
1962 .499 
1963 1.318 
1964 .916 
1965 .669 
1966 .525 
1967 Not avail. 
1st 3 months 
1968 
Barley Wheat Wheat 
Rice (1) (2) flour 
.202 .290 .360 .044 
.023 .323 .428 .051 
.004 .032 .133 .039 
- - .350 .032 
- .190 .330 .018 
- .047 .377 .021 
.118 .263 .789 .027 
- .226 .545 .062 
- .106 .441 .055 
.032 - .340 .119 
.139 .003 .636 .014 
.020 .062 .334 .014 
1957-1966 from MAF, Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics:
 
Grain Statistics 1967, pp 90-91
 
1967-68 from Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Review
 
(June 1968), pp 102-103
 
(1) Barley imports are shown at "unpolished weight" for
 
1957-1966. The Bank of Korea publication does not state if its
 
figures for 1967-1968 are on same basis.
 
(2) Wheat on this chart is quoted in 
Exports of Grain, 1959-1967
 
(Mil. MT)
 
Total grain
 
Year export 

1959 .005 

1960 .025 

1961 .008 

1962 .064 

1963 .006 

1964 .014 

1965 
 .-26 

1966 .050 

1967 Not available 

grain form. 
Rice
 
.005
 
.024
 
.006
 
.062
 
.006
 
.014
 
.019
 
.044
 
.000 
1959-1966 MAF, Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics:
 
Grain Statistics 1967, pp 90-91
 
1967 Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Review (June 1968),
 
p 92
 
Korean Yearly per Capita Consumption
 
Rice 

Barley 

Naked barley 

Wheat 

Rye 

Miscellaneous cereals 

Soybeansmillet,etc. 

1965
 
Kilograms 

130.3 

31.9 

23.3 

24.5 

.1.) 

5.8 

5 

Total 222.7 

Reference: pp 132, 1967 MAF Yearbook
 
Metric tons
 
0.1303
 
0.0319
 
0.0233
 
0.0245
 
0.0010
 
0,0058
 
0.0059
 
0.2227
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Grain Warehousing 
Grain storage warehouses in Korea fall into four classes: (1) 
low temperature warehouses, (2) class "A", (3) class "B", and (4) 
class "C", 
At the present time there are two low temperature warehouses
 
completed and in use; one at Seoul with a rated storage capacity
 
of 6,000 metric tons, the other at Pusan with a capacity of 3,000
 
metric tons. Four mcre such warehouses are scheduled for comple­
tion this year with a rated storage capacity of 10,000 metric tons
 
each. Their locations are: Seoul, Pusan, Taegu and Kwangju,
 
These warehouses are of brick and concrete construction with
 
the walls and roof insulated. They have double doors covered with
 
metal sheathing. The floors are concrete, The temperature in
 
each of five compartments is maintained at 150 centigrade. Each
 
compartment has its own cooling unit equipped with a 10.8 kilowatt
 
compressor and a three kilowatt fan,
 
We inspected the warehouse at Seoul which was empty at the time;
 
however, each of the five compartments had a definite musty odor,
 
Class "A" warehouses are thcse of not less than 18 feet in
 
height with reinforced concrete, brick or cement block walls. The
 
floors are of concrete or lime clay mortar, The roof is of concrete,
 
earth roofing tiles; slate, or galvanized iron sheeting The doors
 
are solid with metal sheathing and should be tight, The windows
 
should have wire mesh covering to prevent birds from entering the
 
building when the windows are open, These warehcuses should also be
 
equipped with good ventilators.
 
The equipment in these warehouses consists of scales, fire
 
extinguishers, ladders, stools, arid adequate dunnage.
 
In the Seoul TOAID A-1253 report dated April 1, 1965 which was
 
prepared by Forest Mariner, Grain Storage Consultant the follcwing
 
comaents are noted concerning Class "A" warehouses: 75% of the
 
floors are concrete. Remainder of the floors are dirt, gravel, or
 
wood. These floors should be paved to prevent rodent entry.
 
Doors do not fit well enough to prevent rodent entry. The
 
sheet metal is rusted. The sliding doors do nct fit tightly.
 
Some holes in the side walls. Wooden structures should be
 
Broken windows
sheathed to make them weather and rodent proof. 

should be replaced and have outer screens.
 
Mr. Mariner recommended exhaust fans to lower the inside tem­
peratures. 
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Class "B" warehouses are those whose construction materials and
 
equipment are the same as Class "A". The height of this class of
 
warehouse may not be less than 16 feet.
 
Class "C" warehouses are those which do not meet the specifica­
tions of Class "A" or "B" warehouses. 
The classification of grain storage facilities determines to 
what height the number of straw bags may be stored. Class "A" 
warehouses may store straw bags 12 to 15 high; Class "B" from 9 to 
11 bags high and Class "C" seven to eight bags high. The height of 
the building is the principal determining factor for classification, 
to provide more air space between the tops of the piles and the
 
roof of the building. 
Further storage comments by Mr. Mariner are as follows:
 
"Suchon, Seoul and Suwon - very few warehouses rodent proof.
 
No shortage in space area.
 
Kangwon (Chunchon) - Few warehouses required as it is a food 
deficit province close to the demilitarized zone. 
N. Chungchong (Chongju, Chungju and Tanyang) - Class "A" ware­
houses in very bad shape, rice deficit province. 
S. Chungchong (Taejon, Nonsan and Changhang) - Warehouses need
 
repairs. Managers state that storage rate too low. Repairs
 
cannot be made because of lack of funds,
 
N. Kyongsang (Taegu, Pohang and Kyungju) - Class "A" and "B" 
warehouses in Taegu in good repair.
 
S. Kyongsang and Pusan Special City (Ulsan and Pusan) - Many 
private warehouses in Pusan. Dock warehouses in need of 
repairs. Warehousesmen suggested relocation of some ICA­
type warehouses. 
S. Cholla (Kwangju, Mokpo and Yosu) - Mokpo facilities in
 
excellent condition. Yosu warehouses in very bad shape.
 
Cooperative warehouses in Sengju were best visited in Korea.
 
Kwangju which is the fourth largest city is short of ware­
house space.
 
Cheju warehouses in fair condition. This province imports rice.
 
Island is very rocky, Additional warehouse space, when
 
required, could be constructed of stone.
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The provinces of S. Cholla (Chonnam) and N. Kyongsang
 
(Kyongpuk) rank first and second respectively as the largest
 
They also rank in
grain producing provinces in the country. 

the same order for grain storage capacities, S. Kyongsang
 
(Kyongnam) which ranks third in production is sixth in ware­
house storage capacity. S, Kyongsang lies in the south eastern
 
section of the country near the Special City of Pusan,
 
The greatest inequality of grain production warehouse
 
capacity ratio is in the province of Kyonggio This province
 
ranks sixth in grain production and third in total warehouse
 
capacity.
 
The Special City of Pusan ranks seventh in grain warehouse
 
capacity and the Special City of Seoul ranks ninth."
 
Modern warehouses should reduce the loss-of rice and other
 
grains now experienced through spoilage, rain, pests, theft, and
 
fire reported as follows:
 
Losses in Gov't Contrclled Rice in 1966 (MT)
 
Ground
 
Total
Total Unexplained Spoilage storage 

loss Theft Fire losses
handled disaonearance loss 

Weight 290,063 9,907 8,231 6,250 3,722 1,680 29,790
 
2.2 1,3 0.6 10,3
% of total 100.0 3.4 2.8 

21.0 12.5 5.6 100.0
% of loss - 33.4 27.6 
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Grain Polishing and Milling
 
Korean Rice Milling Capacities by Provinces (Polished)
 
(Includes all types of mills: small scale, National
 
Agricultural Cooperative Federation, and large scale
 
mills)
 
Province 

Seoul 

Pusan 

Kyonggi-Do 

Kangwon-Do 

Chungchong-Pukto 

Chungchong-Namdo 

Cholla-Pukto 

Cholla-Namdo 

Kyongsang-Pukto 

Kyongsang-Namdo 

Cheju 

Total 

* Straw bag: 60 kilos.
 
Number 

of mills 

162 

100 

2,736 

1,149 

1,981 

2,741 

1,856 

3,245 

3,879 

2,708 

0 
20,557 

Daily Grind
 
Capacity (10 hr./day)
 
Straw bags* Metric tons 
6,435 386.1 
6,917 415.0 
55,552 3,333.1 
21,071 1,264.3 
35,190 2,101.4 
53,753 3,225.2 
43,092 2,585.5 
66,920 4,015.2 
76,499 4,589.9 
65,135 3,908.1 
0 0 
430,564 25,823.8 
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Korean Barley Processing by Provinces - Daily Grind 
(10 hr./day) Capacity Includes all Types of Mills 
(Polished) 
Province Nc.of Plants Straw Bags Metric Tons 
Seoul 15 7,353 441.2 
Pusan 136 17,737 1,064.2 
Kyonggi-Do 2,728 22,893 1,373.6 
Kangwon-Do 1,308 5,458 327.5 
Chungchong-Pukto 2,063 5,935 3561 
Chungchong-Namdo 2,841 15,074 904.4 
Cholla-Pukto 1,870 15,854 951.2 
Cholla-Namdo 3,227 28,702 1)722.1 
Kyongsang-Pukto 3,898 21,267 iZ76.0 
Kyongsang-Namdo 3,187 14,716 883,0 
Cheju 3 92 0. 9 
Total 21,664 155,921 9,300.2 
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Daily Flour Milling Capacity in Commercial Mills
 
Authorized by Korean Government (See Footnote)
 
24 hr. grind-
Name and permitted capa-
Province location of mill city in barrels 
Seoul Daesun Mlgo Co. 
Han 11 Mlgo Co. 
-
-
Seoul 
Seoul 
2,377 
2,568 
Tongbang Youliang Co. - Seoul 1,579 
Pusan Don Ah Mlg, Co. - Pusan 4,926 
Taemang Mlgo Co. - Pusan 1,205 
Taesong Sanob Co. 
Shin Keudong Mlg. 
-
Co. -
Pusan 
Pusan 
896 
2,282 
Shinhan Mlg. Co. - Pusan 2,916 
Han Ill Mlg. Co. - Pusan 1,579 
Chae-il Sugar Co. - Pusan 5,453 
Keumsung Koopo Co. - Pusan 1,207 
Namsun Kiksan Co. - Pusan 1,025 
Yungnam Mlg, Co. - Pusan 1,239 
Kyonggi Taehan Mlg. Co. - Inchon 10,005 
Samhwa 141g. Co. - Inchon 2,237 
Don Ah Mlg, Co. - Inchon 3,338 
Kyongsang-Pukto Hando 11g. Co. - Taegu 1,138 
Poonggook Sarob Mlg, Co. -Taegu 1,013 
Daedong Sanob Kongsa 1,185 
Cholla-Pukto Honam Mlg, Co, - Kunsan 1,503 
Chungchong-Pukto Shinheung Mlgo Co. - Chungju 2,308 
Chungchong-Namdo Shinheung Mlg. Co. - Taejon 1,132 
Total 53,111 
Footnote: Capacity stated is not full capacity or potential grind
 
for all the mills. Some are capable of higher amounts. 
- 33 -
Daily Flour Milling Capacity in Gristmills in
 
Korea by Provinces
 
Province 

Seoul 

Pusan 

Kyonggi-D 

Kangwon-Do 

Chungchong-Pukto 
Chungchong-Namdo 
Cholla-Pukto 
Cholla-Namdo 

Kyongsang-Pukto 

Kyongsang-Namdo 
Cheju-Do 

Total 

Noof Plants 

529 
57 
1,557 
1,158 
1,822 
2,568 
1,400 
1,898 

3,547 

2,619 
0 
7,155 

24 hr.day grind total
 
grind capacity in barrels
 
801 
81
 
1,655 
1,281
 
1,920 
1,132 
1,422 
1,977
 
3,803
 
2,676 
0 
16,748
 
Daily Total Flour Milling Stated Capacity by Provinces
 
Commercial and Grist Mills
 
Province 

Seoul 

Pusan 

Kyonggi-Dc 

Kangwon-Do 
Cnungc hong- Pukto 
Chungc hong-Namdo 
Cholla-Pukto 
Cholla-Namdo 

Kyongsang--Pukto 
Kyongsang-Namdo 
Cheju-Do 
Total 

Number of barrels
 
7,325
 
22,1809
 
17,235
 
1' 281 
4,228 
2)264 
2,925 
1,977
 
7,139
 
2,676 
C, 
69,859
 
Imports of Grains Quantity in Metric Tons 
- Page 91, 1967 Yearbook -
Kind of Grain 1252 - 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1966 
Rice 3,759 - - - 118,408 - - 31,500 
Barley 31,644 - 189,790 47,119 263,461 225,872 106,257 -
Wheat 133,422 348,730 329,579 377,054 788,757 545,438 440,954 339,666 
Maize (corn) 670 9,596 - 1,493 33,789 5,000 - 2,875 
Sorghums 26,019 - - 947 17,802 - - -
Soybeans 28,772 35,890 21,616 16,161 10,118 8,934 - -
Barley (Polished) - - - - - -
Wheat (Polished) 3,990 -. - -
Wheat flour 38,988 31,867 18,410 20,748 26,562 61,791 54,826 118,697 
Corn meal - 38,520 43,360 34,644 55,670 59,052 61,585 30,019 
Others - 3,085 68 1,031 3.528 9,538 5,257 2,186 
Total 266,664 467,688 603,123 499,207 1,318,095 915,625 668,879 524,943 
Exports of Grains Quantity in Metric Tons 
- Page 90, 1967 Yearbook -
Kind of Grain 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1 1965 1966 
Rice 5,000 24,159 5,842 62,002 5,706 14,300 19,208 44,294 
Soybean 201 390 1,404 435 - - - -
Blackbeans - - - 240 - - 1 28 
Redbeans 252 60 1,220 1,652 504 190 5,057 4,252 
Millet (unhulled) - - - 124 - 1,820 1,299 
Millet (Polished) ..- - 10 2 
Buckwheat .... 133 - - 621 
Buckwheat flour - - - - - - 1 1 
Total 5,453 24,609 8,466 64,329 6,467 14,490 26,097 50,497 
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Average Grain Production
 
Average Production of Principal Grains (Source: Korean
 
Statistics of Food Crops in 1968)
 
Kind of Grain Weight in Metric Tons
 
Rice 3,758,551 
Barley 925,821 
Naked Barley 820,004 
Wheat 306,339 
Rye 33,154 
Millet 64,312 
Corn 36,130 
Soybeans 166.205 
Total 6,110,516
 
Rice Year 1967 Planted Area
 
Number of Total production
 
Kind of Grain hectares planted in metric tons
 
Rice 1,231,328.8 3,919,280.3
 
Barley (polished) 1,138,790.3 2,374,661.1
 
Misc. grains 169,953.2 107,107.2
 
Pulses 341,746.4 195,010-7
 
Potatoes 208.318.7 97l,625.2
 
Total 3,090,137.4 7,567,684.5
 
Comparison of Area Increase of Cultivated Land for All
 
Crops - 1960 v.s. 1966
 
Unit usedi Hectare
 
lear Total One crop Multiple crops Upland 
1960 2,024,804 807,238 399,014 818,553 
1966 2,293,088 696,601 590,517 1,005,970 
%of 
increase +13.25 -1.37 +47.9 +22.7 
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1968 Area for Various Crops, Including Multiple Use 	of the Land
 
Kind 	 Number of hectares 
Rice paddy 1,292,082
 
Upland rice 51,860
 
Barley 1,331,869
 
Cereals (others) 302,922
 
Floriculture 294
 
Fruits 61,778
 
Vegetables 180,466
 
Special crops 120,874
 
Potatoes 276,047
 
Tobacco 37,275
 
Pulses 	 11,366 
Forage crops 	 35,445
 
Mulberry 	 107,420
 
Total 	 3,809,698
 
Principal Short Grain Rice Varieties Grown in the ROK."
 
Area Growing season Harvest season 	 Varieties
 
Northern 140 days End of September 	 Fujisuka #5 
Shin #2 
Suwon #82
 
North central 150 to 160 days Middle cf Oct. 	 Shiroyane
 
Paltal 
Jaekeun
 
Jinheung 
Pung kwang 
South central 170 days End of Oct. 	 Palkum 
Southern 180 days First of Nov. 	 Nori #66
 
Palkuong 
Kimmaze 
* Information furnished by: Mr. Bae, Sung Ho 
Rice Breeding Section Chief
 
Crop Experiment Station
 
Office of Rural Development
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
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Wheat Storage Capacity of Each Flour Mill 
IJ Republic of Korea 
Milling Wheat storage capacity in.o.
 
No. Name of mills capacity Warehouse Silo Open

-- Blo) (MT) TM) (T 
1 Daehan 10,005 4,580 14,000 47,200 
2 Dong-A (Pusan) 4,926 5,500 10,000 3,000 
3 Daesun 2,377 24,285 5,100 16,000 
4 Hando 1,138 3,884 - 120 
5 Shinhan 2,916 1,200 3,830 8,000 
6 Honam 1,503 22,000 400 •00
 
7 Shinheung(Chungju) 2,308 23,000 800 10,00
 
8 Cheil 5,453 4,000 10,000 10,000
 
9 Samwha 2,237 6,000 - 14,000 
10 Poongkuk 1,013 8,142 - 7,488 
11 Daewang 1,205 8,000 - 8,000 
12 Hanil (Pusan) 1,579 364 6,000 5,000 
13 Hanil (Seoul) 2,.568 10,000 - 50,000 
14 Shinkeuk-dong 2,282 6,000 6,000 500 
15 Dongbang 1,579 8,000 - 5,000 
16 Yungnam 1,239 6,000 - 3,000 
17 Namkok 1,025 2,500 - 3,000 
18 Keumsung 1,207 4,725 600 7,000 
19 Daedong 1,185 5,000 ­
20 Daesung 896 4,670 - 7,405 
21 Dong-A (Inchon) 3,338 3,000 8,000 4,000 
22 Shinheung (Taejon) 1,132 3.600 - i0,000 
Total 53,111 164,450 64,730 2192513
 
Present Dock Side Wheat Wareh(uses for Imported Grain
 
Unit: MT
 
Name City Silo Warehouse Total
 
Daehan Inchon 14,000 4,580 18,580
 
Dona-A Pusan 10,000 5,500 15,500
 
Shinkeuk-Dong Pusan 6,000 6,000 12,000 
Hanil Pusan 6,000 36 6,364 
Total 36,000 '6 444 52,444 
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Port Facilities
 
R. 'tive Iinortance of Major Ports 
(1965 Percent of Total) 
Total amount Coastal cargo
 
pK cargo handled Imports Exports (inand out)
 
35.0% 38.4%Pusan 41.8% 63.4% 

Inchon 18.0 31.4 12.7 3.9
 
o.6 29.1
Mukho 14.0 16.3 
Ulsan 12.2 16.0 0.0 11.6 
Masan 3.6 1.3 3.5 6.3 
Gunsan 3.5 6.7 0.0 0.7 
3.0
Yeosu 2.4 2.0 0.0 
Mokpo 2.3 0.9 3.7 3.5 
Cheju 1.3 00 0.0 3.2 
Pohang 1 1.5 0.0 0.8 
Total. 100.4% 99.4% 99.6% 100.5%
 
Korea Ports of Discharge
 
Data furnished by ROKG; Ministry of Transportation
 
Basis Lower Low Water Datum
 
Minimum Docking Mean tidal 
depth meters rang meters 
9.0 1.33
Pusan 

9.15
Inchon 4.0 
Ulsan I. 0 0.63 
6.06
Kunsan Changhang 9.0 

0.46
Mukho 6.0 (Coal 8.0) 

4.0 0.18
Pohang 

2.18
Masan 7.5 
2.60
Chungmu 3.0 

3.43Yosu 7.0 

Cheju 5.5 2.64
 
Mokpo 9.5 (as of Dec.1, 1968) 4.18 
The important port of Inchon is under development at the
 
present time. At present, grain ships lie offshore at a 12 meter
 
anchorage, some 8 kilometers at sea. Grain is discharged to 
lighters and pulled by tugs to dockside. There is construction 
underway to dredge a deep water channel to dockside, build a tidal 
gate, and maintain 9 meters minimum depth at dock side. Completion 
is expected in 1970.
 
- 40
 
Section III
 
Analysis of the Information
 
Essentially the problems of the ROK grain food supply can be
 
broken down into three inter-related but differentiated segments.
 
They are:
 
1. Physical Logistics---The problems of gathering; moving to
 
appropriate processes; location of the appropriate processes,

including milling and storage; milling and storage capacity; and
 
the movement of the material from processing thru appropriate chan­
nels to consumption,
 
2. Grain Food Technology---The condition of the grain at each
 
step from the field to consumer, including the farmer; the adequacy
 
and efficiency cf the milling resources; the adequacy of the storage
 
space for maintenance of quality and quantity; the kind of rice
 
preferred by the ROK consumer; and the problems of preparation by
 
the consumer.
 
3, Financial-The problems of logi.cally financing improve­
ments in the physical plant for transporting, processing, and
 
storing grains: the problen. of stabilizing the price of grain foods
 
for the consumer: the problem of insurance of an adequate supply

of grain foods for the consumer; the importance of the maintenance
 
of an adequate purchase price for grains from the farmer so as to
 
provide an incentive for increased production of grain foods; and
 
the logical place of imported food grains in the econcmy,
 
We shall analyze the information gathered in the context of
 
those problem categories. We must again caution that the time
 
alloted did nct pcrmit verification of most of the data used, nor 
did the number of observatnns made represent a statistically valid
 
sample,
 
Physical Logistics
 
The physical problems of moving grain to consumers starts wixh
 
the large number of farmers centered in the small village having

quite small farms, In 1966 there were probably about 2,000)000

rice farmers, tilling about 1,231,000 hectares of rice land, and
 
producing about 3,919,000 metric tons of polished rice. The aver­
age rice farmer thus produced about 193 metric tons of polished

rice on 0,606 hectaies of land, They lived in about 56,000 vil­
lages near their land,
 
About 1,783,000 metric tons of polished rice, or 0.878 metric
 
tons per farmer moves to the commercial markets and the balance is
 
utilized by the farmer or sold to area consumers, He retains a
 
portion for seed,
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The majority of the farmers appear to thresh their rice
 
shortly after cutting and even those with competing demands for
 
their time complete threshing of the cut grain within about thirty
 
days. There is seasonal dispersion, due to climate and varieties
 
grown.
 
Movement of rice from the farm to market is spread over the
 
year, with the peak market movement in November-December. In peak
 
month, December, an average, 12.1% of the crop moves to market out
 
of the total of 45.5% moving to market over the year,
 
The 	first movement of rice from the farm is typically to the
 
area mill. One study of a small sample showed 100% of the rice
 
being hulled and polished at the village mill although some 84% of
 
the farms still owned mortors that could do the work at home.
 
Movements from the farm by the farmer first to the mill, and also
 
to market are by quite diverse transportation media. They are:
 
Back packs
 
On the head
 
Hand carts
 
Animal powered vehicles
 
Bicycles
 
Bus
 
Train
 
Motor truck
 
Sold on farm - buyer transports
 
Mechanization and sophistication of the transport method tends
 
to go up as the quantity goes up,
 
There are 20,557 rice mills in the ROK having a capacity of
 
25,824 metric tons per ten hour day, more than enough milling
 
capacity to handle the annual crop now and in the foreseeable
 
future. There may be some temporary dislocations at harvest time
 
by demands for prompt milling, since the reported capacity takes
 
170 ten hour days to mill the present crop.
 
The initial movement from the farm has quite diverse purposes.
 
Among them are:
 
1. 	Tcll milling and retur-, to the farm in polished form for
 
storage, consumption, and later disposition.
 
2. 	Toll milling and sale to the private sector.
 
3. 	 Toll milling and payment of debts. 
4. 	 Payment of taxes and government loans in paddy rice 
(unhulled) farm. 
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5. Toll milling and sale to government.
 
6. Paddy farm sales to the private sector at the farm or mill.
 
7. Toll milling and direct barter for goods and services.
 
8. Sale to the government in unhulled form. 
All of these reasons, and perhaps others, appear to account
 
for significant movements, that are not amenable to reduction to
 
a standardized form. Any recommendation to standardize the move­
ment from the farm would appear to be doomed to failure within the
 
foreseeable future. That does not necessarily mean that a modest
 
start toward modernization of the farm to market system for demon­
stration purposes has no plade in current planning. Surely at
 
some point in the future the use of human manual labor for making
 
straw bags and back packing grain to market will be too wasteful
 
for this developing society.
 
Some 54o5% of the rice is utilized by the farmer and his
 
family fpr food, seed, or feed. Typically, he stores that rice, an
 
average0 about one to one and 1 metric tons, in one or more of the
 
rooms of his house. The portions of his crop which are withheld
 
from the market at harvest time for later movement into commercial
 
channels are also stored in the home.
 
Indications are that in the magnitude of 90% of the home
 
stored grain is in the polished form. Typically it has moved to
 
the mill and back to the farm.
 
A small sample study indicated that home storage was about
 
67% in straw bags with the balance in miscellaneous other vessles.
 
When rice enters commercial channels there are three major
 
avenues accounting for 75% or more of the volume and countless
 
devious routes to market for the balance, The three are:
 
1. The private sector is by far the more important merchandizer
 
of rice in Korea. Various approaches, and authors, result in esti­
mates varying from about 58% to 75% of the rice entering commerce,
 
We believe that about 72% or 1,086,000 metric tons of polished rice
 
probably moved to market by some route thru the private sector in
 
RY 1966. There is no set pattern of flow but the mode would seem 
to be: Producer -- 4 Local Assemblers ---> Area Assemblers -- 4 
Wholesalers ---> Retailers, The numbers of entrepreneurs so 
engaged were not determined, 
2. The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation, a quasi­
government directed organization, consisted of some 17,970 village 
co-ops, 139 central area co-ops, and five large city stores in 1965. 
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The stores sell to wholesalers, retailers, and direct to consummers.
 
The cooperatives appeared to collect.and market about 10%
 
of the commercial rice, or about 151,000 metric tons, in RY 1966.
 
The usual flow of the co-op grain is: Producer ---> Village
 
co-op -->k Area co-op --->
 
Co-op stores --- Wholesalers ---, Retailers ---> Consumers
 
3. The Food Administration Bureau cf the Ministry of Agri­
culture is charged with purchasing and marketing sufficient grain
 
to level out supply-demand fluctuations, stabilize prices, and
 
provide price incentives to the farmer. They acquire rice by:
 
a. 	Purchase of both polished and paddy rice primarily
 
from the farmer.
 
b. 	Payments in rice for fertilizer supplied by the gclern­
ment.
 
c. 	Repayment of government exchange grains in rice by
 
the farmer.
 
d. 	Payments of land taxes in rice.
 
The Government Bureau collected and marketed about 273,000
 
metric tons of polished rice equivalent in RY 1966 or approximately
 
18% of the commercial grain.
 
The government buys and collects rice thru some 3,000 buying
 
and inspection offices well distributed throughout the producing
 
areas.
 
The Government Bureau utilizes the Cooperative stores and
 
field selling agencies as its selling agency. The grain may
 
physically pass thru the co-op facilities or it may be delivered
 
directly to wholesalers and retailers with the co-op performing
 
a brokerage service only,
 
The usual flow of government rice is: 
Warehouse 
Producer ---> Government Purchasing Office ---> v 7 ----> 
Miller 
Cooperative Store --> Wholesalers ---> Retailers --->Consumers
 
L -----------------------------------	 -------------- I T 
Most of the government rice is purchased and stored in unhulled
 
form in the producing areas and milled as the movement to the con.­
suming areas starts,
 
The Korean Ministry of Agriculture expects to increase the
 
supply of home grown rice, and their plan extending to 1971 appears
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to have technical support. They project 4,802,000 metric tons of
 
polished rice equivalent in 1971. This amounts to an increase of
 
about 39% over the 1965 base year used in their projections.
 
Logistic planning must take this projected increase into account.
 
Barley is second to rice as a food grain crop in South Korea.
 
Because it is secondary to rice less data is available concerning
 
it than is available for rice and there are some rather wide dif­
ferences in the data from the sources available to the team. The
 
current five year development plan uses an estimate based upon
 
field survey data that does not coinside with the official published 
statistics, The Ministry of Agriculture (MAF) deeams the survey 
based data to be more accurate and useful. We have found it neces­
sary to use both sources for our needs; however, we do not deem the
 
bias so injected to significantly affect the results of our study.
 
Common barley is grown by about 1,300,000 farmers on 494,000
 
hectares of land, 1966 production was about 975,000 metric tons.
 
The average farmer produced about 0.739 metric tons on 0375
 
hectares of land in 1966.
 
Naked barley is grown by about 878,000 farmers on 467,000
 
hectares of land. 1966 production was 1,043,000 metric tons. The
 
average farmer produced 1,188 metric tons on 0.532 hectares of
 
land.
 
Barley is grown both on paddy fields, in rotation with rice,
 
and it is the predominant crop on unirrigated upland cultivated
 
land, It is predominately fall sown and late spring ha-vested.
 
Commercialization of barley is not extensive, It appears from
 
interpolation of the limited dati available that only about 34% of
 
the crop or 525,000 to 550,000 metric tons enters commercial channels,
 
The peak month for the barley movement to market is July with
 
perhaps six to seven percent of the crop or 110,000 metric tons
 
moving to market at that time,
 
We did not find data to indicate how barley moves to market;
 
however, we believe from conversations that it follows essentially
 
the same channelsas does rice, Government appears to use barley
 
as a supplement to rice in compensating for shortages of rice.
 
Government uses barley as a diluent for rice, At the present time,
 
restaurants are required to use some 30% pearled barley with rice.
 
Due to its late spring - early summer harvest time barley 
does not compete with rice for storage, milling and transport 
capacity, Barley production is not expected to change significantly
 
to 1971o
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Indigenous wheat is grown on about 153,000 hectares by about
 
1,393,000 farmers. The 1966 production was about 315,000 metric
 
tons. Each wheat farmer produced, on average, about 0.226 metric
 
tons of wheat from about 0.11 hectares of land devoted to wheat.
 
The present indigenous wheat supply does not move into com­
mercial channels in significant volume, It is largely consumed on
 
the farm, The stated reason for lack of use of this grain in the
 
domestic flour milling industry is lack of suitable quality for the
 
uses to which the commercially milled flours are put -- too soft.
 
That statement is unverified, Collecting the small lots grown by
 
the average producer is also a problem,
 
The wheat grown is fall planted and late spring - early
 
summer harvested; therefore, it does not compete significantly for
 
warehouse, and transport space with rice, The plan for the future
 
indicates a quite sizable increase in wheat production from
 
191,000 metric tons of flour equivalent to 536,000 metric tons of
 
flour equivalent in 1971, This is a 356% increase, The stated
 
basis for attaining it is largely dependent on the diversion of
 
barley land to wheat production. This projection appears to rest
 
on a nebulous assumption, as this team views the data It would
 
certainly be in the interest of the domestic economy if wheat of
 
suitable quality for the uses nide of wheat could decrease depend­
ence on imports after PL 480 aid is reduced or eliminated.
 
The principal wheat of commerce in Korea is imported, At
 
present, the source is the United States. In 1966, 339,666 metric 
tons of wheat and 118,697 metric. tons of wheat flour were mported, 
equal to a total wheat equivalent of about 500,000 metric tons. 
Of that total, 89,000 metric tons or about 18% came in through 
purchases with foreign exchange and the balance were imported 
under PL 480, 
The bulk of the imported wheat and flour enters Korea thrcugh 
the ports of Pusan and Tnchon, Pusan is a deep water porto All 
but the largest cargo vessels can berth at its piers ander load. 
Inchon is presently a shallow water port, Ships must stand off 
shore. The grain is lightered to the dock side, Plans are developed
 
to improve Inchon harbor to berth large vessels,
 
At dock side, imported wheat is generally packed into straw
 
bags, weighed and then transported by truck or riil to the twenty
 
two existing commercial flour mills.
 
Dock side storage facilities for wheat at these two ports is
 
inadequate.
 
- 46 -
Grain storage at the wheat flour mills is inadequate.
 
The twenty two wheat flour mills of Korea have a daily wheat
 
They will
flour capacity of about 4,722 metric tons of flour. 

grind about 6,296 metric tons of wheat daily at capacity. Stretched
 
to a 300 day year, about all that a well managed flour mill can
 
expect to do, they could grind about 1,888,800 metric tons of wheat
 
annually, which is well above any current demand projections. They
 
are obviously over-built, or under utilized today. The present
 
imports of wheat and wheat flour equivalents and the 1971 projection
 
of internal wheat production could each be processed in 80 to 90
 
days operating time per year, or both could be processed in about
 
165 days per year. A drastic change in eating preferences would
 
seem to be required to tax the wheat flour milling capacity presently
 
available,
 
Available data on soybeans is not extensive and there appears
 
to be less interest in it than in the major grains discussed here­
tofore.
 
We estimate that about 1,676,000 farmers raised about 160,177
 
metric tons on 279,991 hectares of land in 1966. This equals about
 
0,096 metric tons from about 0,167 hectares for each farmer growing
 
soybeans,
 
We have no significant data on the farm to market channels for
 
We do know that a signi­soybeans cr the food uses made of them. 

ficant pcrtion of the crop is used for soy sauce and curd production.
 
We have seen no data to indicate that soybeans have an import­
ant place in the long-range food grain plans,
 
There are several additional food grains and seeds grown and
 
utilized for food purposes including rye, corn, beans, and millet.
 
They do not presently represent a significant factor in the grain
 
problem in Korea and there are no projections of increases in their
 
supply that should cause them to contribute significantly to the
 
problem.
 
Milli-ig facilities for all grains appear to have adequate
 
capacity to process the grain crops now and into the future at
 
least to the year 1971 for which changes are projected. While
 
observations, literature investigati.ons, and discussions with other
 
people indicate that much of the facilities are obsolete and quite
 
depreciated by western standards, there was nothing in the data
 
uncovered to indicate significant economic justification to modernize
 
the milling segment of the grain industry. We suggest for the pur­
pose of the current study that improvement of the milling facilities
 
may logically be left to the entrepreneurs who operate them.
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Transportation is a national problem. There is a rather com­
plete network of both railroads and roads over which grain may move.
 
The railroad needs road bed work and rolling stock to serve the
 
nation adequately, The roads need improvement and more trucks to
 
provide good service. Little use is being made of the potential
 
for coast-wise and river water transport, These problems are not
 
particularly oriented to the grain industries, but, of course, food
 
transport is of paramount importance to the welfare of the country.
 
A detailed study by competent people has been made of the
 
transportation industries and much work is underway to implement
 
the improvements needed, We suggest that further study of the
 
transport problem, as it relates to the grain movement, can be left
 
to the transportation people in both governments, with one import­
ant exception, Specific site selection for any grain facilities to
 
be built must take into account the transportation service avail­
ability as it exists then and the specific plans for improvement,
 
if adequate facilities do not exist, at each site selected. Food
 
material would probably always enjoy a high priority for available
 
service.
 
The study team concludes from the data available that two
 
problems of physical logistics exist that, if solved, will essenti­
ally correct all of the significant problems of that category in
 
the grain movement to mar-et. They are;
 
1, Adequate storage of rice, Because of the seasonal move­
ment of the various grains, provision of adequate) scund storage
 
for rice, the principal grain, will substantially solve the entire
 
domestic grain storage problem.
 
2. There is inadequate storage and handling facilities for
 
imported grain at the ports of entry and at the commercial wheat
 
flour mills.
 
Grain Food Technology
 
The principal storage repository for rice in Korea is the farm
 
home. With about 54.5% utilized by the farmer and the balance
 
tending to move to commercial channels over thE crop year, rather
 
than at harvest time, condition of the grain in the retail markets
 
is determined in great measure by how well the farmer handles it in
 
his home. The Korean rice farmer prizes his grain, understands in
 
general, if not technical terms, what is required to keep it well,
 
and consequently, under adverse conditions, he does a remarkably
 
good job in sending well conditioned rice to market.
 
He appears to harvest his rice, typically, at about 20 to 23%
 
moisture. He typically field drys in the swath, (or may also sun
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dry on straw mats after threshing), to about 16 to 17% moisture.
 
He may lose additional moisture in the range of one to two percent
 
in storage in his home.
 
In a small sample survey of 300 farms the estimated losses in
 
home storage were about 13% of the rice so stored, which is con­
siste-nt with indicated losses in the government storage program.
 
These farmers estimated that 88°7% of their storage losses were to
 
rodents, 7,5% tc insects, and 3.8% to spoilage.
 
If we assume reasonable accuracy for the data available, the
 
farm sector losses 13% and marketing channels lose 10% of the grain
 
handled, (all interpolated from available data). We have a total
 
annual loss from all causes of approximately 605,000 metric tons,
 
basis the volume grown in 1966, The overall average loss from the
 
crop, so computed, is 17.3%.
 
This provides the volume base for real savings to the economy
 
of the nation, Such losses cannot be reduced to zero. Parts of
 
the losses represent moisture losses and ncne of the other factors
 
can b,. completely eliminated. Certainly this is a high loss ratio,
 
amenable to reduction by improved warehousing, handling, and
 
processing from farm to market.
 
Mcst of the farm storage is in straw bags and is subject to
 
pest infestaticns, There is probably no way that the farmer could
 
increase his inccme and the naticn its food supply more easily and
 
with less expense outlay than could be accomplished by a determined
 
educational effort tc improve the storage vessels in the farm home
 
so that they are made pest proof. The common fired clay jL.rs used
 
for perhaps 10% of farm storage, properly covered tc exclude pests,
 
would probably be quite adequate. Some sizable portion of abcut
 
455,000 metric tons lost could thus be saved,
 
The Ko'rean rice condition problem originates with the high
 
moisture content at which they attempt to store the grain0 The
 
government standards for the three numbered grades simply place a
 
.aaximum of 16% mcisture All data bserved indicates that the bulk
 
of the grain enters commercial channels at between 15 and 16%
 
moisture, Climatic conditions of high temperature and high rela­
tive humidity through the late spring and summer compound the
 
problem, Seed respiration, micr-bial growth, and insect propaga­
tion are all promoted under such a combination of conditions and
 
all three of these deleterious biological conditions can and will
 
contribute to quality deteriorationo
 
The Korean people bave told us that their people prefer the
 
soft, high moisture rice for the following reasons:
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1. The flavor and eating quality of the rice more nearly
 
equals the prime, preferred, newly harvested rice than does lower
 
moisture grain.
 
2. Lower moisture grain does not cook properly with the low
 
heat output, habachi style stores used. To attain satisfactory
 
cooking results the rice must be pre-soaked. A nutritionist con­
sultant stated that habitually the Korean people will pre-soak
 
such rice with more water than needed and discard the excess
 
before starting to cook. in pre-soaking, valuable vitamins and
 
minerals are leached out of the grain and lost if the soak water
 
is discarded, Such losses can be ill afforded in a diet so depend­
ent on rice.
 
Nowhere in the literature known to the team, or in the experi­
ence of the team, have the above two objections to dried grain
 
been raised, or investigated.
 
Most of the Western world solves the moisture problem by
 
artificially drying the grain to a safe level between 12 and 13A% 
moisture. For Korean conditions that level would be more nearly 
12-12.5%. 
Japanese rice is marketed at moisture levels more nearly like
 
The maximum
Korean practice; however, at a somewhat lower level. 

moisture content for any grade is 15% and the maximum for the 1st
 
Even at these levels the Japanese experienced dif­grade is 14%. 

ficulty in storage, They store unpolished, hulled, brown rice.
 
Low temperature warehcuse tests were initiated in Japan as
 
early as 1952 and the use of lw temperature warehcusing has pro­
are reported to be
gressed from that point to today, Today there 

168 low temperature warehouses storing brown rice in Japan with
 
a capacity of 216,500 metric tons,
 
The reported storage conditions in Japan are 14 to 15% mols­
ture brown rice, 15-C warehouse temperature, and 75% relative
 
humidity, The results reported are excellent, with even retention
 
of full quality in the rice bran oil.
 
Korea adopted the Japanese idea for long-term storage, It 
presently has built a 6,000 metric ton low temperature house in 
Seoul and a 3,000 metric ton house in Pusan. It has plans to con­
struct four additional low temperature houses in distribution 
centers this year, totalling 40,000 metric tons capacity,
 
The first year's experience with low temperature storage in
 
Korea has not been good. Rice deteriorated, The responsible
 
people believe that their difficulties resulted from inability to
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maintain temperature and humidity control, accentuated by power
 
failures. They believe that personnel training has progressed
 
to the point that their difficulties are corrected for the future.
 
A decision should be reached as to which process for protect­
ing rice condition offers Korea the better long-term avenue - low 
temperature storage or drying, If this team was forced to make a 
judgement on the available evidence we would recommend drying, but 
we believe that judgement may be biased on insufficient evidence 
and, therefore, we shall be recommending additional investigation
 
into the subject before a decision is reached.
 
As this rep;rt is being writLen we are nearing the end of the
 
old crop rice year. Domestic ri:e- supplies are very low. This is
 
the time of year when "out of condition" rice should be most pre­
valent after the hot, humid storage season. We have seen about 100
 
rice samples. None of the samples we have seen have shown any
 
significant deterioration of the kind resulting from the moisture
 
content - temperature - humidity complex. We have no real basis to
 
criticize the quality results of storage other than the well known
 
facts of safe storage conditions.
 
In nine warehouses visited in the Seoul area the team observed:
 
Low 
Class B B A C B tewpBemp. A C 
Live rats 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 
Rodent pellets 0 0 8 Many 4 0 0 5 0
 
Live birds 0 0 0 Pigeon 0 0 0 Yes 0
 
feathers
 
Bird excreta 0 0 0 Yes 0 0 0 0 0
 
Insects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 0 Yes Yes Yes
 
Foreign odor None None None Rodent None Musty None None None
 
odor odor
 
* No rice in store in low temperature warehouse. 
Relatively too much emphasis has been put upon height of the
 
building in warehouse classification. We do not disagree with the
 
use of height as a classification factor but we cannot agree that
 
a house with obvious rodent entry and one with obvious insect
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infestations should be classed in "A" Class and paid accordingly.
 
There is no evidence that routine inspection for classification is
 
made. We believe inspection should probably precede every use of
 
space by the government. The government payment for Class "A" space
 
approximates $7.20 per metric ton or about $0,.0 per 60 kg bag per
 
annum. This should be enough to permit adequate maintenance of
 
thf; properties, if the property is utilized much of the year, The
 
actual rates are on a sliding scale, per day basis.
 
We deemed the Class "A" and Class "B" space we observed quite 
amenable to maintenance of satisfactory conditions at quite reason­
able maintenance costs. The Class "C" space we observed could
 
hardly be deemed suitable for food storage, One "C" house could 
not logically be repaired to meet reasonable standards; the other
 
"C" house could only be improved at considerable cost. Class "C" 
space, as it is now defined, is generally unsuitable for food 
storage.
 
Of the storage space available in the nation, government deems
 
the following to be of real use to it:
 
Low
 
temp. ,,A" "B" "C" Total 
No. of houses 2 291 887 1,249 2,431 
Metric tons storage 9,360 141,523 275,570 165,925 592,378 
Area in sq. meters 3,967 155,336 282,927 227,532 669,762
 
The total reported potentially usable by government is:
 
Low 
temp. "A'' "B'" "C" Total 
No. of houses 2 254 1,309 2,876 4,441
 
Metric tons storage 9,360 134,102 361,347 364,304 869,113 
Area in sq. meters 3,967 123,088 368,686 477,903 973,644 
Obviously the two sets of data are at variance.
 
Theoretically, there is quite enough total storage space in 
the country to house the rice crop at the rate it moves to market. 
The problem is not area under cover. Instead, it is the quality of 
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the available space, and in some instances, the location of the
 
available space.
 
Government's maximum inventory in the year May 1967 to April
 
1968 was 544,355 metric tons in April 1968o That inventory
 
included 126,225 MT of Califcrnia rice, about 46,000 MT of barley,
 
and miscellaneous minor items. 235,291 MT or 43% was unhulled
 
paddy rice and 15% or 81,953 MT was Korean polished rice. The
 
government's storage problem is considerably greater, under food
 
grain shortage conditions, than it would be simply as a regulator
 
of the domestic supply.
 
If one assumes that all Class "C" space is beyond redemption 
then space available to the government drops to about 505,000 metric 
tons with no consideration given to the quality of the specific 
"A" and "B" space or its location, 
The increased production projected to 1971 will increase the
 
demand for stcrage space but not propoftionately to the increase
 
in domesti4 volume, The foreign component of the rice inventory
 
should disappear and the quantities needed to perform the regula­
tory functions of the government should not increase proportionately. 
Storage capacity in a.l channels of the farm to market movement 
will certainly have tc be expanded to accept another 1,357,000 
metric tens at harvest time by 1971, if we accept the projections. 
We shall recommend a two directional attack on the warehouse
 
space problem;
 
1. Improvement of the existing repairable space, and
 
2, Construction cf new space to replace the existing unrepair­
able space, plus enough to house the increased volume expected on
 
a phased basis.
 
If we project the commercialization rate of the increased
 
production at the present rate we find the rice storage space pro­
blem to be about as follows:
 
Assumptions: Total commercialization rate 45,5%
 
Then coml, RY 1966 1,510,000 MT
 
t " RY 1971 2,210,000 MT
 
With urban consumption level, then monthly
 
disappearance from inventory equals:
 
1966 - 126,803 MT
 
1971 - 184, 200 MT
 
Using monthly commercialization rates (P 204 Grain 
Statistics Yearbc k), peak commercial storage 
requirements are January - 1966 - 490,573 MT 
January - 1971 - 652,184 MT 
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Projected production 1971 4,858,000 MT
 
RY 1966 recorded production 3,501,000 MT
 
Existing space is properly located. 
Then storage requirements appear to be:
 
Year RY 1966 1971
 (Present) (Projected)
 
MT Polished MT Polished
 
Farm at harvest 3,501,000 4,858,000
 
Commercial at peak 490,573 652,184
 
Unit 

816,113 -
Available total 

-
Available "A" & "B" 505,000 

Shortage "A" & "B" - 147,184 
ROKG Planned additions 1968-69 46,000 
repairableThis means that at best with all "A" and "B" space 
and repaired and it was all in the proper locations all existing
 
capacity would be completely full at the present peak inventory
 
This, of course, portrays an impossible condition. The
period. 

46,000 metric tons of construction planned by the ROKG for 1968-69
 
construction should help significantly,
 
With 40,000 tons of that storage to be refrigerated storage,
 
making a total of 49,000 tons of refrigerated storage available
 
for the 1969 crop there will still be a wide gap in protection for
 
If we assume present level commercial demand of
the summer needs, 

126,803 MT per month for the four mnnths June-September the inven­
tory in all commercial pcsitions would have to be about 507,000
 
metric tons at the start of the critical season, To the extent
 
that summer grains are substituted and urban rice consumption is
 
lowered during the summer period that demand would be lowered,
 
However, by any measurement a large gap will persist between
 
protected storage available and demand,
 
That gap can be filled by either refrigerated storage or by 
storing dried grain in sound, conventional warehouses fully meet­
ing Class "A" or "B" standards. The less costly method will 
probably prove to be dried grain. 
For reasons of economy in site selection, flexibility in
 
outbound movements, and the desirability of helping to minimize
 
the rapid urbanization of the population we will suggest that
 
maximum use be made of production area building sites for any new
 
construction. We suggest that an urban supply of 60 days maximum
 
should permit orderly transpcrt and distribution. That is an
 
arbitrary number selected as a result of U.S. experience and bears
 
further refinement as it relates to Korean conditions. It seems
 
reasonable to us, viewed from what we believe to be the conditions
 
in Korea.
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The limited sample of rice mills observed and the reports of
 
other observers is that the rice mills of Korea are generally old
 
and in a poor state of repair. Sanitation conditions and prac­
tices within them are intolerable by United States Food and Drug
 
Administration standards; however, this team has been unable to
 
discern serious deleterious results of that indicated condiion
 
in the records of performance of the mi.ling sector and the samples
 
of grain collected for examination.
 
The key milling equipment appears to be a Korean made disc
 
type sheller with counter weighted control of the discharge and 
thus control of the polishing severity. Ln the two mills observed 
one haJ 18 consecutive passes thru 6uch machines, and the other 
16. 
Milling results reported are surprisingly good. Rice yields 
approximate 72% nationally with about 1% separated broken, an 
additional 1% separated fine broken, 5% bran, and 21% hulls and 
loss in milling. Examination of samples did not disclose signi­
ficant under-milling, Relatively high, but not unreasonable, 
inclusion of broken rice in the finished product would serve to 
reduce the average grade by U S, standards. The reported mill­
ing yields shown above approximate those attained in California 
on similar sh:rt grain varieties, in California bran extraction 
would approximate 9%, and hulls plus milling losses 18 to 19%. 
This simply indfcates a probable loss in Korea of bran tc. hulls, 
by reason 'f the milling nqethods, in the magnitude of 3 to 4% of 
the total grain, Imprcved hullers would probably eliminate this 
loss to KoreaIs grain eccncmy., 
'Ihe bulk :f the Korean rice crop appears to be toll milled 
for the farmer at a most reasonable toll of about. 3% of the grain. 
The government official processing payment for milling rice as 
of January 1, 1967 was 101,2 won ($0,369) per 60 kg straw bag cf 
polished rice. With a rice price of 2,410 won ($8,80) to the 
farmer for a 60 kg straw bag the toll amounts to about 72 won 
($,264), At such reccveries the Korean miller should be able to 
well afford t- modernize his plant with pr-fit to himself, and 
benefit to the farmer and the nation. 
Probably the most helpful modernization step he could take 
would be general adoption of the Japanese made Satake or Kyowa 
rubber shellers, The Japanese hullers and whiteners also offer 
opportunity We must reiterate, however, the perfcrmance recorded 
by the Korean rice milling sector is quite good. Therefore, the 
opportunity is one of profitable refinement, rather than a demon­
strated need for a radical overhaul. 
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Of about 100 rice samples the team has been able to observe,
 
the quality has been quite good from a deterioration viewpoint. 
We have seen none that would be downraded for that reason. Some 
samples would be downgraded by U.S. standards 'or chalkiness.-.

Some samples would be downgraded for higher broken grain content. 
Red rice and foreign matter .re generally no problem. As a whole
 
the rice was well milled, We have seen nothing in the samples to
 
indicate any general condition that would detract from the value
 
of Korean rice as a healthful, acceptable food product.
 
Improvements in the milling systems and proper drying could 
reduce the broken grain component to a more attractive level and 
would help extraction rates. 
.lotefrices- Polished Rice 
(1967 Grain Statistics Yearbook)
 
Unit: 100 L,(80kg)bag
 
U.S. Dollar
 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
 
Farm price #1 grade $630 $10.04 $12.49 $11.72 $12.36
 
Wholesale price
 
#1 grade 6.45 10.22 12,66 12.13 12°48
 
Gross margin 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.41 0.12
 
% of wholesale -
Value added 2.3 1.76 1.34 3.4 0.96 
Value added - 5 year average - gross margin - $0.206 or $2.575 
per metric ton 
5 year average - value added - 1.96%.
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Approximate Value Added and Material Cost
 
to Government - 1966 
Rice
 
#2 grade purchase price 54 kg - 91,562 
#2 grade wholesale selling price 60 kg - 02,550 
Yields 
 #2 rice - 72.07% 
Broken rice - 0.86% 
Finely broken rice - 0.78% 
Rice bran - 5.26% 
Broken rice selling price - 54 kg J9580 
Finely broken rice selling price - 54 kg #550 
Rice bran selling price - 36 kg 0210 
Uned bag credit -- 1 each per 54 kg paddy )120.2 
Material Cost per Metric Ton Polished Rice
 
Paddy - 1.3875 MT $105.56 - $146.46 
Credits: 
Broken 0.0119325 MT @ $39.20 = $0.47 
Fine broken 0.0108225 MT @ $37.17 = 0.40 
Bran 0.0729825 MT @ $21.29 = 1.55 
Used bags "'5.7 @ $0.0737 = 1.89 
Bulk material cost 1 MT #2 ) $142.15 
Grade polished rice ) 
Wholesale selling price 1 MT #2 grade - $155.11 
Value added by manufacture and distribution - $12.96 
% value added by manufacture and distribution - 8.36% 
4.31 
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3overnment Grain Account
 
Operating Statement Summary
 
Year Revenue Expenditures Profit or (loss)
 
1961 $28,792,700 $24,968,800 $3,823,900
 
40,243,000 (7,755,700)
1962 32,487,300 

1963 56,689,000 50,232,000 6,457,000
 
1964 74,992,000 65,197,000 9,795,000
 
(7,237,000)
1965 51,084,000 58,321,000 

(2,969,000)
1966 100,151,000 103,120,000 

Net six years $2,114,200
 
Average six years $ 352,360
 
Government rice expense per metric ton
 
1966 - Interpolated from p, 107, Grain Statistics Yearbook
 
Commissions 
 0.68
 
16.55
Handling 

0.77
Losses 
Credit sale of deteriorated rice (-) 0.31 
"Special Account" expense 3.74 
Total $21.43 
Financial 
If we can believe the reported data,the rice industry is being
 
operated almost exlusively for the benefit of the farmers and
 
consumers and a remarkable job it is. For example, in 1966 the
 
reported difference between prices to the farmer for polished rice
 
and the wholesale price was only 0.96% or about $1.50 per metric ton
 
to provide storage and handling, plus administrative and selling 
expense, and leave some entrepreneurial profit along the way. It can 
hardly be done for such a cost. The five year average figure was 
better at $275 or 1.96% but is still quite inadequate to provide 
adequate facilities and services. For thiat amount, village level 
gathering and storage; transportation to area level gathering and 
storage; and transportation to con,3umption area and storage must be 
coverea, For comparison in U.S. terms, that would be about $0017 
per 100 lbs bag to provide these services. That could hardly be 
accomplished anywhere and provide incentive to own and operate good 
facilities. If. in fact, it is done for that margin, it is being 
accomplished at the expense of the facilities. The total amount 
available, basis 1966 commercialized volume of 1,510,000 tons would
 
be about $3,888,250 at the indicated average margin and $2,265,000
 
at the indicated 1966 margin, Fifty year straight line depreciation
 
alone on the government's new class "A" warehouse will cost $1.85 per
 
metric ton of storage space annually, and more for a house that isn't
 
fully utill.zed twelve months per year.
 
The government cost and margin data, calculated from the records
 
provided, shows a better margin than does the polished grain sector 
discussed above but it, too, is not. self-sustaining at present. The 
value added to rice of $12.96 per metric ton or 8.36%of the selling 
price is equal to $0.59 per 11)0 lbs to cover all costs. This is 
more nearly in keeping with reasonable margins; however, the published 
cost basis for expense items not covered in the material cost calcu­
lation above totals $21,43 per metric ton leaving a deficit of $8.47
 
per metric ton of rice in 1966. The loss reported of $2,969,000 can
 
probably largely be attributed to failure to cover costs on the rice
 
movement. 354,752 metric tons collected at a loss of $8.47 ,ach would
 
equal $3,000,475, an insignificant deviation from the $2,969,000 loss
 
reported.
 
It seems quite clear that the people of Korea and their govern­
ment must be prepared to see the margin between farmers and consumers
 
prices widen significantly if they are to enjoy the benefits of more
 
modern facilities. The only other way apparently open to them would 
be direct subsidy from general funds. The latter approach does not
 
meet the engineering economy tests usually applied to AID loans of
 
this nature.
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The responsible people in the MAF state that ROKG cannot
 
internally finance the new construction needed for proper grain
 
management at this time. Study of the state of the economy in the
 
nation causes us to agree with them. It could only be done by
 
additional debt financing which would add to the inflationary trend,
 
or by substitution of this work for projects deemed to warrant a
 
higher prioriuy. Neither of those methods of financing the work that. 
is needed are likely to be acc.eptable,
 
The ROK has c-apabilities to prxtuce excellent warehouse space 
internally. All of the material elerients for masonryr construction 
are available in Korea at reasonable cost. There is a high rate of 
unemploymbnt and underemployment. Design competence is also
 
available. A new insulated masonry warehouse constructed in Seoul 
this year is reported to have cost $554,740 for 5,289 sq meters of 
space that is capable of housing 6'000 metric tons. This is $104.89
 
per sq meter ($9,74/sq ft) or $92.46 per metric ton ($4.19/100 lbs).
 
Double wall insulated metal prefab structures from the U.S. will 
cost as much in place and they will be inferior structures by com­
parison with indigenous masonry.
 
Under these conditions. it behooves everyone concerned to try
 
to find a source of capital fo construction of warehouses that is
 
not tied to the Foreign Assistance At of 1961 with its current
 
requirement of 90% U.S. components, The Asian Development Bank,
 
Manila, has been suggested as a likely source of funds, at attractive 
rates, that. w')uLd permit, the use of indigenous materials and labor. 
Preliminary Loan AppLication Projects 
Two specific projects have been handed to the study team for
 
review. They are:
 
(1) MAF application for a loan of $7,700,000 (rotal cost 
$9,367,360) to provide 30 warehouses capable of storing 108,000
 
metric tons of grains, and
 
(2) A Cooley Loan application for X270,000,000 ($985,400) to
 
partially pay for the facilities needed to establish a bulk silo grain 
storage business at dock side at the ports of Inchon and Ulsan.
 
150,000 metric tons of storage would be provided at each port. The
 
applicant is the Yu Poong Grain Silo Co,, Ltd. 
We shall review each of these applications.
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MAF Application
 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry through its Food
 
Administration Bureau is held responsible for regulating the flor
 
of grain, including imports, to assure an adequate supply for the
 
people; stabilization of grain prices to insure proper pricing for
 
the consumers; incentives to the farmer; and it is responsible for
 
the management of grain inventories used to provide control; among
 
other duties.
 
The Grain Management Section of the Bureau collects grain in
 
the country, primarily from the farmer, largely, in the case of rice
 
in paddy (unhulled) form. Typically, grain is stored in straw bags,
 
case of rice, in conmercial warehouses until it
in paddy form in the 

is needed in the urban, consumption centers. Warehouse space
 
considerations wall force grain into the consumption canters at
 
harvest time in greater volume than is required to meet current needs0
 
Analysis of the available data, and observations made of a
 
limited number of warehouses, indicates that there is sufficient total
 
area to house the present crop but the Condition of a high percentage
 
of that space makes it, presently unsuitable for food storage.
 
In addition to the actual physical losses suffered by the
 
government amounting to a total of about 10%, the rice in inferior
 
storage deteriorates in quality through the summer months, the months
 
in which the government provides its principal consumer market
 
regulating function,
 
To provide the supply needed to feed the people, and to
 
stabilize prices throughout the shortage periods, prior to the new
 
rice crop harvest from late September to early November, the
 
government's peak inventory is shown to be in April, just prior to
 
the start of the hot season, This means that much of the grain must
 
be housed in the class "C" space generally believed to be quite
 
unsuitable for food storage.
 
There is public criticism of the quality of rice resulting from
 
the current stoiage practices, Although we have been unable to observe
 
rice with the usual characteristics of damage caused by high moisture
 
grain stored under high temperature - high humidity conditions, the
 
descriptions we have received from all 5ources parallel the results
 
we would expect to see under the conditions existing. These conditions
 
result in off flavor, off odors, and off (clor resulting from rapid
 
respiration in the grain and proliferatic.i of microflorao The
 
criticism of off quality in rice is probably quite valid since all of
 
the conditions are present to provide such a result0
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Prior data shown in this report has demonstrated to the
 
satisfaction of this team that there is a definite need for more than
 
the 108,000 metric tons of space requested in the application. We
 
can conceive of no likely situation under which any part of such space
 
We deem it to be only
construction would later prove to be wasteful. 

phase I in a long-term program to upgrade grain food storage space by
 
both new construction and improvements to the better existing
 
structures.
 
We do not presently have confidence in the site selections shown
 
Much more work needs to be done to
in the preliminary application. 

firmly determine the site selection according to the longer term plans
 
If drying is to be the preferred
selected for preservation of quality. 

method t','n the construction of warehouses for milled, bagged grain
 
will be lower in total and would best be located in the distribution
 
centers only. Storage in the producing areas would be in the bulk,
 
paddy form and would move to milling and the distribution centers on
 
a demand basis. If refrigerated storage is to be the preferred
 
method, then greater flexibility, lower ownership costs, better balance
 
in distribution of work opportunities, and population dispersion would
 
tend to dictate maximum use of production area sites.
 
The 30 warehouses covered in the application are estimated to be
 
corrugated steel outer shell, prefabricated buildings with an inner
 
exposed, roll, fibre glass insulating sheet. No refrigeration is
 
planned. This approach does not appear to follow the logic of the
 
direction the ROKG has been following. If protection of the high
 
moisture grain can best be done by refrigeration then the new 108,000
 
metric tons of space should be refrigerated. That tonnage plus the
 
of 49,000 metric tons would 3till be less
currently planned total 
than the required inventory for the August-September period. It is
 
for reasons of economy.reported that refrigeration was not included 
We submit that refrigeration should be included, if the further
 
studies we will recommend result in the selection of refrigeration as
 
the better alternative to drying.
 
Insulation, without refrigeration, does not prevent heat trans­
mission through a building shell. It simply slows down the rate of
 
transmission so that, in the case of the subject buildings the range
 
of temperatures inside would be less than the 24 hour!, outside range.
 
It would be warmer in the night hours and cooler in the daylight
 
The mean over a period of time would
hours than outside conditions. 

To the extent that the maximum
be approximately the same. 

temperatures are reduced, insulation without refrigeration would be
 
expected to have limited value.
 
- 62 -
If further studies determine that drying offers the better
 
alternative for preservation of quality then we do not deem insulation
 
to be a necessary, or good investment. Grain dried to the recommended
 
levels can be safely stored with just reasonable attention to sound
 
warehousing practice without the cost of insulation in the warehouse.
 
Storage in bulk silos becomes practical and economical for
 
properly dried grain. Properly constructed and managed silo storage
 
eliminates rodent losses. Silo storage makes storage in the paddy
 
(unhulled) form more practical. Damage to rice stored in the paddy
 
form will be lower, on average, than when stored in the polished form.
 
Steel bins can be used to store rice successfully but properly
 
constructed concrete silos are better. Korea has some competence in
 
the construction of concrete silos. We do not know how much. It
 
has been reported that Koreans have built three cement silos, two
 
with static forms and one using the preferred slip form method. We
 
have not observed this construction, This potential should be
 
investigated if drying is the successful a lternativeo
 
Concrete silo storage for paddy rice could perhaps be built for 
a magnitude approximately the same as sacked warehouse space, both 
calculated to a polished rice basis. Further engineering study would 
be needed to establish such costs, The size of the silos that can be 
used will have a great,bearing on such a comparison. If little, or 
no, lotting is necessary we would expect bulk storage to be competitive 
in first cost and more economical in operation. 
We do not deem unprotected fibreglass, roll type insulation to
 
be satisfactory for grain warehouses in which there will be considerable
 
movement of the inventory and f om which long life is expected0 The
 
roll type material is easily damaged thus losing its effectiveness as
 
an insulator and it also can provide an untenable insect harborage.
 
Under the operating conditions expected in these houses a minimum
 
requirement for the use of fibreglass would seem to be a double wall
 
construction with the inner wall made impervious to insect penetration. 
There are other materials made in the U.S. that, upon investigation, 
might provide sufficient strength and tightness to be used without
 
the double wall, "sandwich" method. This is a subject that should be
 
dealt with by a competent refrigeration and insulation engineer0
 
No detail engineering has been accomplished on the proposed
 
facilities. The estimates appear to be largely rule of thumb
 
estimates from prior work plus some preliminary quotations from a
 
U.S. manufacturer of prefab steel buildings. This estimate needs
 
to be prepared in "project budget" depth, supported by adequate
 
single line, "project budget" drawings with specifications to properly
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meet M.O. 1221.. An adequate appraisal of the feasibility of the
 
subject project cannot be accomplished without such data. We will
 
sugge3t a -cope of work to provide adequate information. Our
 
impression of the estimates, also using rule of thumb projections,
 
is !.at the sums requested are approximately adequate to complete
 
the construction in the manner intended by the applicant.
 
The plan of construction contemplated in which the AID loan
 
would essentially provide U.S. prefabricated super structures to be
 
erected out of the Korean portion of the total funds, on foundations
 
laid out of the Korean funds, is quite practical if properly coordinated.
 
The detail design is to be a ROKG function. If "project depth"
 
engineering is properly accomplished and some supervision and control
 
remains with AID to assure proper utilization of the funds both in
 
the detail design and construction phases, we believe that
 
utilization of Korean talent and funds for the bulk of that work is
 
We suggest quite strongly that design and construction
quite proper. 

supervision with at least a joint responsibility to AID and the ROKG
 
is most desirable to assure attainment of the intended benefits at the
 
estimated costs.
 
The estimates of operating expense could not be accurately
 
checked in the time available. Certainly, the number of people
 
calculated for the functions they are to perform seems reasonaole,
 
and perhaps high in locations such as Seoul where four houses may be
 
grouped at one site. It must be understood that the estimates for
 
operating personnel do not include the actual materials handling
 
people, who are furnished by the transportation companies to load and
 
unload product.
 
The preliminary application requests only ten bag conveyors and
 
only five lift trucks for the 30 houses. The rationale for limited
 
used only in five large urban c(enters where turn­mechanization is 

over is rapid.
 
The application requests three men for three months to conduct
 
We will suggest a
a feasibility study at a cost of $50,000. 

different schedule in our recommendations that will more nearly fit
 
the requirements as we view them.
 
Annual depreciation is calculated at 100 years in the application
 
and shown at $80,688 annually. We do not believe that any sheet
 
metal building should carry a depreciation rate below 4%, or 25 years
 
life. At that rate annual depreciation would be $324,000. Good
 
masonry structures, such as Korea builds, may logically carry a 50
 
year or 2% rate. Modern engineering thought much prefers to see
 
declining balance mothods applied, because no one is clairvoyant
 
enough to look even 25 years into the future.
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The calculated benefits from the construction need refinement.
 
An annual saving of $687,744 in commercial storage charges is
 
contemplated based upon 80% occupancy, or 86,400 MT, in the 108,000
 
MT capacity houses, for 365 days per year. The daily rate used was
 
46 for 365 days. We believe that rate and total to be overstated. 
The published rates for storage of polished rice are: 
Won per metric ton per day
 
Class "A" Class "B" Class "C" Field pile 
5.4 4.80 4,50 3.40
 
To these rates an insurance charge is added of $0.56. Insurance;
 
however, should apply to storage in the new houses too, perhaps at a
 
lower rate.
 
Proper utilization of the new space should result in lowering
 
the utilization of field piles and class "C" space if the end results
 
anticipated are to accrue. If that is so, then the bulk of the savings
 
should be at the lower rates instead of the "A" class rate, plus
 
insurance.
 
In actual practice the production area stocks are generally held
 
in paddy (unhulled) form for which the published rates are:
 
Won per metric ton per day
 
Class "A" Class "B" Class "C" Field pile
 
4.80 4.30 400 3.00
 
In paddy form the daily insurance charge is XOo38o
 
It is apparent that the savings in fees quoted are overstated
 
if we are to attain the improvements in storage we all seek.
 
Refinement of these statements will be suggested for the feasibility
 
study.
 
The second item of financial justification quoted is a saving
 
in wastage of $100,538. The governments report shows a total loss of
 
about 10%. The application base is 3%: reduced further by taking only
 
1/3 for warehousing loss, and 1/2 of that as the amount that would
 
actually be saved, netting 1/2%. The full 108,000 metric tons of
 
capacity was used instead of the 80% utility factor.
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We believe thab the loss savings shown are reasonable and _. L 
attainable if the warehouses are used to supplant the most inferior
 
storage, and are managed with loss control as a measured function.
 
The estimate of 1/2% should be too conservative. Refinement of this
 
estimate should become a function of the feasibility study to follow,
 
and we shall so recommend.
 
Without refinement of the cost and benefit data cost-benefit
 
analysis of the project has little meaning; however we did calculate 
equivalence for the stream of earnings and expenditures for twenty-five 
years using the application data. Using 15% interest the benefit­
cost 	ratio is only 0.52. Using 5% the ratio is 1.0467. The inbernal
 
rate 	of return would thus be between five and six percent when using 
data 	we deem to be inadequate fo: approval of the project. These
 
calculations using the five percent rate followl
 
Preliminary Evaluation of Proposal
 
Investment cost
 
U.S. 	 $7,650,000
 
Korea 	 $1,578,950
 
Total $9,228,950 p. 12
 
Annual cost 	 $83,607 p. 12
 
Annual benefit:
 
Storage fee $687,744
 
Prevent wastage $i00,538
 
Total $788,282
 
- 66 ­
Benefit-Cost Ratio at 5% (000 omitted)
 
0.05 Disddudt Present Present
 
Year Cost Benefit Factor, 
 Value Costs Value Benefits
 
1. 9,229 - 1.05 8,789 ­
2. 84 788 1.1025 76 715
 
3. " o 1.1576 73 681 
4. " " 1.2155 69 648
 
5. " " 1.2763 66 617 
6. 2% 1.3401 63 588
 
7. " 1.4071 
 60 560 
8. " " 1.4775 57 533 
9. 
 " 1.5513 54 508
 
10. " " 1.6289 52 484 
11. " 1.7103 49 461 
12. " 1,7959 47 439 
13. i" 1.8856 45 418
 
14. " " 1.97Pq 42 398 
15. " " 2.0789 40 379 
16. " 2.1829 38 381 
17. " " 2.2920 37 344
 
18. " " 2.4066 35 327 
19. " " 2.5270 33 312
 
20. " " 2,6533 32 297 
21. " 
 2.7860 
 30 283
 
22. " " 2.9253 29 269 
23. " " 3.0715 27 257 
24. '" 
 3.2251 26 
 244
 
25. i" 3.3864 25 233 
9,894 10,356
 
Benefit-Cost Ratio at 5% 
= 10356 = 1.0467 
9,894 
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Tn summary, using present charges for warehouse space and 
probable costs derived from a proper feasibility study we would 
not expect this project to show a positive (above 1.0) benefit­
coot ratio at any reasonable interest rate. We do believe that 
the Korean people need improved space and should have it promptly. 
We believe that agreement on logical financing should be the first 
order of basiress. We believe the most logical way is to increase 
the margin between purchase prices and selling prices sufficiently 
to insure the ability to pay for proper facilities and proper man­
agement of the facilities. One can hardly expect either the Qov­
ernment or the private sector to own good facilities, and operate 
them properly, within the margins calculated from the record. 
Yu Pung Grain Silo Co., Ltd. - Cooley Loan Application 
Applicant: 
Yu Poong Grain Silo Co., Ltd.
 
No. 75 Suhsomoon-Dong, Daihan Bldg., Room 304
 
Suhdaimoon-Ku, Seoul, Korea
 
A corporation, Mr. Yong Joon Park, President, incorporated
 
for the purpose of owning and operating the grain warehousing fa­
cilities covered in the loan application.
 
Estimated Capital Required: 
Fixed assets $11,980,000
 
Sources of Capital Expected
 
Paid in by stockholders $ 1,094,890
 
Loan - Buhler Bros., Uzwil, Switzerland 4,380,000
 
Chartered Bank of Englnd - Loan 2,200,000
 
Additional sale of capital stock 729,927
 
Cooley Loan 985,401
 
Total $ 9,390,218
 
Unexplained Capital Shortage $ 2,589,782 
There is a balancing statement entitled "own fund $5,400,000"
 
shown but no indication of how the shortage enters the business.
 
The "own fund" entry appears to be made ,-pas follows:
 
Paid in capital $ 1,094,890 
Additional sale of capital stock 729,927 
Cooley loan 985,401
Unexplained capital shortage 2.589,782 
Total $ 5,400,000
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Facilities to be Provided:
 
Concrete Grain Storage Silo Structures at Ulsan and Inchon having
 
a capacity of 150,000 metric tons each, total 300,000 metric tons,
 
with appurtenant equipment; 20-300 metric ton vessels; and 30 delivery
 
trucks.
 
Applicant's Business Expected Statement:
 
1,300,000 metric tons of grain are imported into Korea annually.
 
The applinant expects to unload 70% of that volume (910,000 metric
 
tons) and store 50% of the volume (650,000 metric tons).
 
Applicant's Statement of Expected Annual Income.
 
Stevedoring - 500,000 metric tons @ $1.28 $ 640,000
 
Storage - 700,000 metric tons @ 4 months @ 0.164 459,000
 
Loadimg,- 700,000 metric tons stored @ 0.547 382,900
 
Transportation - 400,000 metric tons @ 1095 438,000
 
Ship dispatch - 25 ships, 15 days ea @ $1000.00 375,000
 
Merchandising profit - 300,000 MT @ 2.00 600,000
 
Total income $2,894,900
 
Applicant's Statement of Expected Annual Expense:
 
Employment expense $ 155,000
 
Office expense 43,400
 
Insurance 41,900
 
Payment bond 83,900
 
Safety control expense 9,500
 
"Secondary" expense - Foreign loan 35,800
 
Electric power 17,500
 
Miscellaneous operating expense 43,800
 
Depreciation 344,800
 
Taxes and duties 1",600
 
Total expense $ 920,200
 
Applicant's Annual Cash Flow Projection:
 
Annual operating profit $l974,700
 
Depreciation 31_L,800
 
Total annual cash flow projection $2,319,500
 
Year Buhler Bros. 

1. $456,068 

1. 667,813 

3. 639,891 

4. 611,968 

5. 584,045 

6. 556,123 

7. 528,201 

8- 500,278 

9. 239,668 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

Total $4,784,055 

Approximate Loan Repayment Schedules Including Interest
 
CharteredBank,-. 

$176,000 

176,000 

176,000 

176,000 

2,376,000 

$3,080,000 

Cooley-Loan 

$118,248 

118,248 

118,248 

118,248 

118,248 

216,788 

204,964 

193,139 

181,314 

169,489 

157,664 

145,839 

134,015 

122,190 

110,365 

Total 

$750,316 

962,061 

934,139 

906,216 

3,078,293 

772,911 

733,165 

693,417 

420,982 

169,489 

157,664 

145,839 

134,015 

122,190 

110.365 

$2,227,007 $10,091,062 

Approximate
 
Cash Flow Balance
 
($2,319,500 Annually)
 
After Debt Payments
 
$1,569,184
 
2,926,623
 
4,311,984
 
5,725,268
 
4,966,475
 
6,513,064
 
8,099,399
 
9,725,482
 
11,624,000
 
13,774,011
 
15,935,847
 
18,109,508
 
20,294,993
 
22,492,303
 
24,701,438
 
$24,701,438
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Using the applicant's projections, the cash flow generated would
 
be adequate to meet the total loan commitments. Some dividends on
 
equity could logically be paid from the first year on. These calcu­
lations would be altered materially if the capital shortage indicated
 
of $2,589,782, and an additional sum for working capital are brought
 
into the business on a debt basis instead of on an equity basis.
 
The project is reported to have been started on May 16, 1968.
 
Full operation is expected by January 5, 1970.
 
Buhler Bros. of Uzwil, Switzerland, are responsible for the
 
basic design and supervision of the construction of the facilities.
 
They are among the very best engineers and suppliers of grain fa­
cilities in the world. One can depend upon the quality of their work
 
and materials. Their contract does not provide for detail building
 
design and that item does not appear in the estimated costs. Buh­
ler's stated contract restricts responsibility to the machinery and
 
its installation.
 
The drawings furnished with the application are project out­
line drawings suitable for defining the scope of the total work.
 
The work consists of two installations of like nature, one
 
each at Inchon and Ulsan harbors. Each unit consists of: 150,000
 
metric tons of storage space in a house consisting of 72 cylindri­
cal concrete bins and their interstices; a pneurnatic unloading jys­
tem capable of unloading 300 metric tons per hour; adequate con­
veying systems for internal movement of the grain; adequate scale
 
weighing equipment; aeration and fumigation equipment for nine bins
 
only; grair, temperature detection equipment; bagging equipment of
 
adequate capacity; bulk loading equipment of adequate capacity.
 
The design concept for the houses is excellent.
 
The application contains no information to indicate who will do
 
the structural, civil and parts of the electrical design. There
 
appears to be no funds allotted for that gse. There are estimates
 
of construction cost included but no support for them, to provide a
 
basis for analysis0 We believe the estimates for the buildiigs and
 
equipment erection may be understated but we do not say so with
 
assurance. The estimates are:
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Land $ 1,459,854 
4,379,562Buildings 

4,380,000
Machinery 

Machinery installation 	 215,803
 
Miscellaneous 	 893,686
 
Costs for storage 	 $11,328,905
 
20 - 300 MT steel barges 	 211,679
 
328,467
30 - motor trucks 

$11,869,051
Total 

The storage cost is $37.763 per metric ton of space ($1.03
 
per U.S. bushel). This is a low cost for the facilities planned;
 
however, it may be possible at Korean labor and material costs.
 
We would prefer to see bonded bids before accepting the estimates,
 
or at least estimates by known, qualified engineers.
 
The method to be used for silo construction is not stated.
 
The slip form method, properly used, results in a better structure
 
at lower cost. We have no knowledge, for certain, that such con-

We would recommend that
struction skills are available in Korea. 

the slip form method be used.
 
If it were highly desirable to do so, some reduction in the
 
equipment cost would be possible. For example, the 	pneumatic un­
loading equipment is excellent equipment and the nicest way of
 
doing the work. It is also the most expensive in 	first cost, and
 
in operating expense. Dock side cranes, equipped with grain
 
buckets, could probably be provided at less than one half the cost
 
to do the same volume of work.
 
The application shows no commitment of any kind to use the
 
facilities. We raise the following questions:
 
1. The applicant estimates that they will unload 	500,000
 
metric tons of wheat and store it for the flour millers, primarily.
 
They also anticipate transportation of 400,000 metric tons. KOFMIA
 
(The Korean Flour Millers Industrial Association) are reported to
 
have stated that they are unaware of the project. Without support
 
from their members the estimates of income are probably meaningless.
 
2. 	The applicant anticipates the storage of 200,000 metric
 
indication
tons of the Government's stocks of grain. There is 	no 

that such a commitment has been made by the Government.
 
3. The applicant anticipates merchandising 300,000 metric
 
tons of grain. We do not question the nominal mark up of $2.00
 
per ton he anticipates. We simply ask, to whom would he sell the
 
grain a. long as PL 480 dominates the grain impovt picture?
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We have to question the selection of Ulsan as one of the two
 
sites. There is no flour milling capacity in Ulsan. Ulsan has a
 
new deep water port and is excellent from that viewpoint. The
 
problem is, the flour mills are located in Pusan, 71 kilometers by
 
rail from Ulsan. Assuming the millers are willing to use the ser­
vice in the first place, we then must ask are they willing to pay
 
for 71 kilometers of "out of line" haul to avail themselves of the
 
service? Pusan contains about 43% of the commercial flour milling
 
capacity of Korea and it would have to be the principal customer
 
of the Ulsan house. From a "line of flow" viewpoint this team
 
deems the proper location for such a storage house to be Pusan
 
harbor instead of Ulsan. Location in Ulsan would appear to be bur­
dening the economy with a needless transportation cost.
 
Staffing of the operation at 203 people is quite excessive by
 
U. S. standards; however, rates paid are low. Well managed, and
 
with competent people in the key positions, additional profit could
 
be shown, in the projections, from this source.
 
This team fully recognizes a need for port dock storage facili­
ties. USAID/K has estimated that at least 1,000,000 metric tons of
 
imported grain will be needed in Korea as far into the future as
 
can be foreseen. Good facilities, approximating those proposed,
 
should serve that need well if properly financed, and those who would
 
be the users of the service agree that the facilities will be uti­
lized.
 
- 73 	 -
Section IV
 
Recommendations
 
We shall divide our recommendations into two categories:
 
(1) 	Those items which the Government of Korea, with perhaps,
 
nominal assistance from USAID/K, should be able to accom
 
plish at little cost to the government and with con­
siderable potential benefit.
 
(2) 	Those items which require expert study to refine data,
 
in the form of a feasibility study.
 
Suggested ROK Government Action
 
Farm 	Storage 
We believe that in the magnitude of 455,000 metric tons of rice
 
stored on the farm are lost annually, primarily to pests. A
 
campaign to improve farm home storage, if successful, would prob­
ably provide more additional profit to the farmers and grain foods
 
to the economy, at lesL cost, than any other step that might be
 
tauen. We suggest that a vigorous campaign, to accomplish such
 
results, might include:
 
(1) 	PreparatIon and wide, free dissemilnation of a pamplet
 
describing the losses sustained, including the average
 
farmers' financial loss, ways of storing grains on the
 
farm so that it will remain pest free (fired clay jars,
 
simple block structures, etc.); what to do if it becomes
 
insect infested, wet, or starts to heat.
 
(2) 	Prepare press and radio releases outlining the benefits
 
to the farmers from better care of grain.
 
(3) 	Utilize all of the offices of NAPIO, the cooperatives,
 
and all area agricultural advisors to carry the word.
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Warehouse Classifications and Inspection
 
We suggest that the government needs to re-examine its public
 
warehouse classification, inspection and payment system. We
 
suggest that the following points be considered for inclusion in
 
such a program:
 
(1) Warehouses classes "A", "B", and "C' shall be as they 
now are described. In addition, the description may
 
read:
 
(a) 	Before food grains may be placed in a public
 
warehouse for the government account, a NAPIO
 
inspector shall inspect said warehouse for freedom
 
from pests. Any pests, rodents, rodent excreta,
 
live birds, bird excreta, or means of access for
 
such pests, when the access doors are closed, shall
 
result in iegrading that warehouse to class "C" 
immediately, and if used for storage it shall be
 
paid 	according to the class "C" scale. 
(b) 	As long as government owned grain remains in a 
warehouse it shall be inspected periodically in 
the same manner as in (a) above, and regraded as 
of that time, if sub-standard conditions are found. 
(c) 	Storage for grains in -lass "C" space shall be the
 
last accepted and the first moved out.
 
(d) 	Stored grain in class "B" space shall be moved out
 
before that ii, class "A" houses, during the period 
May 1 to September 30. 
(2) 	 higher prices should be considered for "A" and "B" storage 
as redefined above. The new rates should be based on
 
a study to determine how much additional is required to
 
provide both the funds and incentive to maintain condi­
tions as described above. No change should be made in
 
class "C"' rates. Using government data, bare costs, with­
out profit, would !ost the operatoi about $2 per day, if
 
a good house were full 365 days per year. The published
 
class "A" rate of 1.4 would cover annual costs at a
 
load factor of 36% (Break even point) or about 133 days.
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An increase of )#l to 6.4 would decrease the break
 
even point to a load factor of 31% or 113 days,
 
approximately. What ever is determined a reasonable
 
load factor, an incentive fee for management plus 11­
to be added. A chart of payments based
profit needs 

length of storage can also be constructed, if wanted,
on 

that would reduce governments cost for the longer term
 
storage. Without having done the recommended study it
 
that 	an "A" class rate of about W6.4 to
 appears to us 

"B" class rate of about ).0 should make$6.5 	and a 
government storage reasonably attractive uader the
 
suggested rules.
 
Sanitation Practices
 
The Korean people responsible for warehouses, and the government
 
program, appear to be well aware of the basic need to keep grain
 
foods free of pests. It appears to this team that there is Just
 
We suggest that action follow all reports of
inadequate action. 

infestations by the NAPIO inspections recommended above, where
 
government stozks are involved.
 
Where rodents are involved eliminate entry ways, trap,
(1) 

and poison with anti-coagulants such as Warfarin.
 
Where insects are involved utilize Phostoxin (trade
(2) 

name for aluminum phosphide) as a gaseous fumingout
 
under tarpaulins. Warehouse surface sprays, using
 
- pyrethrin formulations should be
piperonyl butoxide 

used to routinely spray the building surfaces.
 
(3) 	Prepare literature necessary to disseminate information
 
on usage of these materials.
 
It should not be necessary to employ consultants to
(4) 

initiate such a program. 
The manufacturers of the
 
materials will generally assist quite readily in the
 
FOLLOW THEIR RECOMMENDA­development of usage plans. 

TIONS TO THE LETTER. 
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Consumer Testing
 
Initiate a series of consumer tests in the home economics
 
department of one of universities, KIST, or other qualified
 
research entity, to determine:
 
(1) 	Is there any difference in flavor between rice dryed
 
to 12 to 137 moisture and rice dryed only to 15 to 16%
 
moisture? These tests should be blind tests, using
 
several different lots of rice, with parts of each
 
sample qffered at both the high and low level.
 
(2) 	Experiments should also be conducted to determine
 
whether there is, or is not, a problem in cooking
 
dryed rice when using the usual 19 hole briquette for
 
fuel, la the typical "Habachi" style stove.
 
Such tests should of course be conducted on a scientific basis
 
without opinionated bias. We believe the capabilities to do so
 
exist within the Seoul area.
 
Rice 	Milling
 
Government may wish to disseminate information on rice milling, 
designed to encourage modernization of the rice milling capacity 
of the country. Nominal, but worthwhile, improvements in extrac­
tion results could accrue to the benefit of the farmer, the 
miller, and the economy by adoption of the Japanese Satake and 
Kyowa rice milling machines - particularly their shellers and 
polishers. We suggest that help in evaluation of the potential, 
and preparation of promotion material may be available from said 
manufacturers at little or no cost to the government.
 
Finance
 
The government has three areas of finance that this team believes
 
it should study immediately. They are:
 
(1) 	Warehouses of superior quality can be built of indig­
enous masonry materials, fabricated by Korean labor
 
with benefit to the country, when compared to metal
 
shell structures imported from the U.S. The ROKG,
 
with USAID/K assistance, should exhaust every source of
 
attractive term, loan money that would permit use of
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these domestic ma-erials, before accepting the 90%
 
U.S. component formula of USAID loans. The Asian
 
Development Bank, Manila,, has been suggested as one
 
likely source.
 
(2) 	With new investment money for construction in short
 
supply, the government should seriously consider the
 
possibility of entering long team leases for the full
 
use and control of the best of the "A" and "B" space
 
that 	is properly located. Each potential leasehold
 
should be reviewed in terms of the maintenance money 
that would be required to put it in condition and keep 
it in class "A" shape, as hereinbefore defined. An 
invitation for offers to provide new space to lease
 
could result in offers by private citizens to build
 
new houses. A lease program might solve the govern­
ment's problem faster at less financial cost than any
 
other approach. 
(3) 	We recommend that the goveinment immediately start a
 
review of its pricing policy. We deem the margin
 
between prices paid the producers and the prices charged
 
the consumer quite in-adequate to support sound practices
 
and sound facilities for the farm to market grain move­
ment. We see no logical way of repayment of any loans
 
made for facilities construction other than to add the
 
t
proper cos s of ownership and efficient management into
 
the price differential. We believe that the government's
 
price regulating function is also serving as a deterrent
 
to proper storage and handling practices in the private
 
sector. We take the view that proper storage and
 
handling of food grains is in the interests of the
 
consumer, and assumption of the costs to do so, should
 
be borne by the consumer. A decision should be reached
 
prior to completion of the feasibility study, next
 
recommended, as to how any loans resulting from it are
 
to be repaid. This team sees no other logical, accept-­
able way other than to increase the price differential
 
between the producer and the consumer.
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FEASIBILITY STUDY
 
We recommend that a formal feasibility study be made of the
 
grain storage problems of Korea to guide the ROKG and USAID/K in
 
their further actions. We recommend a scope of work substantially
 
as follows:
 
1. General Conditions
 
a, The contractor shall prepare a feasibility study
 
under the conditions and in the form prescribed by the USAID
 
Manual Order 1221.2, and any amendments thereto in effect as of
 
the date of the contract. The contractor shall have, and be
 
familiar with that Manual Order. The pertinent instructions from
 
that Manual Order are not necessarily repeated herein, but are
 
herewith made a part of this scope of work by reference.
 
bo All drawings required to be provided shall be single
 
line, "project budget", type drawings in sufficient detail to
 
provide estimates of cost and to illustrate to professional
 
engineers the cnnstruction recommended.
 
c. All cost estimates shall be prepared in sufficient
 
depth so that professional engineers may evaluate both the units
 
employed and the extensions,
 
d. Special reference is herewith made to the require­
ment for inclusion of a required training plan, and its costs,
 
for management and cperators of the facilities recommended.
 
e. All benefits and cost-benefit analysis shall be
 
presented in sufficient detail so that professional economists
 
may properly evaluate the study,
 
2. The Study
 
a. It shall first be necessary for the contractor to
 
familiarize himself with the preceding work pertinent to the
 
present problems of grain storage and handling in Korea. The
 
Kansas State University review of 1968 and its bibliography will
 
provide such source material,
 
b. Before recommendations for construction are undertaken,
 
the contractor shall first determine which of two alternative
 
approaches to rice storage in Korea offer the ROK the better invest­
ment opportunity and the more satisfactory solution to prevention
 
of quality deterioration in Korean rice,, Those alternatives are:
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(:i) Construction of refrigerated, insulated ware­
houses, in which bagged rice will be stored.
 
(ii) Construction of rice dryers in the producing 
areas of the nation, coupled with either bulk or bagged conven­
tional storage houses for unhulled paddy rice, and conventional
 
bagged storage warehouses in the consumption centers.
 
The contractor shall be required to investigate
 
refrigerated rice storage in Japan, as a base on which to form­
ulate his recommendations.
 
The contractor shall make his alternative recommend­
ations to USAID/K and ROKG, and obtain their approval of the
 
alternative selected, before proceeding to detail that alternative.
 
That recommendation shall be in sufficient detail to permit
 
reasonable comparison of:
 
(1) Construction costs -- unit and total.
 
(2) Operating expense.
 
(3) Engineering considerations applied.
 
(4) Product quality results.
 
Upon approval of the alternative selected, the con­
tractor shall proceed to detail that alternative only; however,
 
the study shall contain the data used to support the selection.
 
c. The contractor shall be required to detail only
 
those facilities that will be required to fulfill the ROKG control
 
functions; however, the work should also serve as an effective
 
guide to the private sector of the grain business.
 
d. The contractor shall be required to determine the
 
proper location for new facilities, and he shall provide sufficient
 
soil data to support his foundation design for each site.
 
e. The contractor shall investigate transportation service
 
availability at each site selected to insure against failure of
 
the facility to be properly served.
 
f. The contractor shall investigate utility services at
 
each site selected to insure against failure of the facility to
 
be adequately served.
 
g. The contractor shall determine the proper size and
 
capacity of all facilities recommended.
 
h. The contractor shall recommend the timing for construc­
tion for each of the facilities he recommends. In so doing he shall
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not only take into account the present volumes of grain to be
 
handled, he shall also take into account the projections of popul­
ation changes and production increases to the year 1971.
 
i. If the contractor recommends use of the drying alter­
native he shall be required to cnsider the wisdom of starting the
 
construction phase on a carefully supervised, regional demonstra­
ticn unit basis. 
j. The contractor shall consider, and make recommenda­
tions with respect to the desirability of starting to prepackage 
rice in consumer size packages, at carefully selected commercial 
rice nills where quality may be controlled. (There is much rice
 
The time may be propitious
sold at retail in liter quantities. 

for buch marketing advance).
 
The contractor shall be required to investigate the
k. 

storage of imported grains and make recommendations with rt3pect
 
to port storage of those portions for which the government is
 
In doing so he shall take into account:
responsible at the port, 

(1) Plans of entrepreneurs to enter this business.
 
(2) The support to be expected from the private
 
seclor, particularly with respect to KOFMCA members 0 
l The benefit-cost analysis prepared by the contractor 
shall be an equivalence study demonstrating the internal rate of
 
return that ran be expected from the constraction reCoNmended, or 
such other method as is approved by the ROKG and USAID/Ko 
m, The plan of stoyage propcsed shill be bubmtted to
 
the ROK and UN Military C;ommands fcr defense approval prior to
 
performince of the detail drafting and economic evaluation. Alter­
nativeo suggested jy the responsible military commands shall be 
evaluated, 
While a specific scope of w-rk is herein required,
n. 

the ROKG and USAID will welcome, and the contractcr is.herewith
 
required to present, other alternatives for consideration which
 
he believes will ither improve the construction for its intended
 
purpose, enhance the results, or reduce the cost: without loss of
 
effectiveness.
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Magnitude Estimate of Feasibility Study Manpower Requirements
 
General Requirements 
Project Manager - Project Supervision and Coordination - 20 man
 
weeks
 
Office Manager - Contract Accounting and Office Services for 
Professionals - 20 man weeks 
Mechanical Engineer - Refrigeration Specialist - 4 weeks solving
 
Alternative Problem
 
Mechanical Engineer - Drying Specialist - 4 weeks solving Alter­
native Problem
 
Structural Engineer - Grain Storage Specialist - 4 weeks solving
 
Alternative Problem
 
Cereal Chemist - Rice Specialist - 4 weeks solving Alternative 
Problem
 
Economist - Section Leader - Coordination and Analysis - 20 man
 
weeks 
Economist - Grain Prod. and Distribution data - 12 man weeks 
Economist - Accountant - Benefit-Cost data - 12 man weeks 
Office Services 
Driver - 1 for 12 weeks 
Secretaries 1 for 20 weeks - 1 additional for 4 weeks, during 
report preparation 
Iiterpreter - 1 for 12 weeks
 
and,
 
For Dryer Alternative Design
 
Structural Engineer - Grain Storage Specialist (Section Leader)
 
- 16 mrn -ieeks 
Mechanical Engineer - Drying Specialist - 4 man weeks 
Mechanical Engineer - Grain Machinery Specialist - 12 man weeks 
Electrical Engineer - 2 man weeks 
Draftsman - 30 man weeks 
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or, 
For Refrigeration Alternati.ve Design 
Structural Engitieer - (ISecti-on Leader) - 14 man weeks 
Mechanical Engineer - Refrigeration Specialist - 2 man weeks 
Electrical Engineer - 2 man weeks 
Draftsmen - 20 man weeks 
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